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POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM IN THE MAKING OF 
CONTEMPORARY CUBAN SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY PRACTICE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Larry Catá Backer* & Flora Sapio* 
Abstract 
The language of democracy and democratic organization is 
usually spoken only in the vernacular of liberal democracy. Liberal 
democracy, mostly of western origin centers legitimacy of a 
political order on open, full, and free election for representatives, 
as well as a substantially unregulated civic space in which 
individuals and others can engage in political discourse. This 
essentially exogenous form of democratic organization has been 
increasingly challenged in the 21st century by an alternative 
model of endogenous democracy more compatible with states 
organized along Marxist Leninist principles. These emerging 
forms of endogenous democratic practices have been developed 
along two distinct lines, one embedded in developing principles 
for Chinese Marxism-Leninism, and the other grounded in the 
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history and context of Cuban Leninism. While adherents to 
orthodox principles of liberal democracy have rejected any efforts 
to consider the plausibility of Marxist-Leninist democratic 
practice (principally because it requires suspension of the core 
operating principles of liberal democracy, though not its effects), 
these emerging alternative forms of democratic organization are 
worth serious study, if only because of their potential influence on 
the development of the optimal model of developing states. This 
article focuses on the development, since the 1959 Revolution, of 
a Cuban version of Socialist Consultative Democracy.  
The article traces the origins of the contemporary expression of 
Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy in two early attempts by 
the revolutionary government to transform the practices of 
bourgeoise democracy into something different. These attempts, 
one at direct popular affirmation of leadership policies, and the 
other an institutionalized system for popular consultation, 
emerged in new forms after 2011 and have found their most 
complete expression in the complex processes of popular 
consultation and popular affirmation that marked the Cuban 
constitutional reform process of 2018-2019. What makes this 
particularly interesting is the way that it may provide a glimpse 
at the development of a set of practices (and the theory seeking to 
legitimate its forms) that might provide other developing states 
with an alternative path to democratic engagement that 
minimizes the risks of traditional liberal democratic practice. The 
article starts with context, considering the contours of the 
fundamental problem of ordering democracy and its compatibility 
with the political model for illiberal states. It then turns to the 
development of what will become Cuban Socialist Democratic 
models. To that end, it looks to the two principal sources from 
which these principles were developed. The first is the 
development of mechanisms for popular affirmation of the actions 
of the vanguard party; the second is the development of models of 
popular consultation under the guidance of the vanguard party 
and structured through a representative assembly. Taken 
together, these two elements contributed to the production of the 
initial or 1.0 version of Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy. 
The article then considers how that more primitive model 
developed (along with Cuban Leninist theory) under the 
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leadership of Raúl Castro from 2011. It traces the pragmatic and 
theoretic developments from early efforts around the development 
of the Guidelines for Reform of 2011, through the articulation of a 
new political and economic model in 2016, and then emerging in 
its current 2.0 form in the elaborate process of popular 
consultation and affirmation of the 2019 Cuban Constitution. The 
paper covers the challenges, contradictions, and potential for this 
endogenous form of democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2019 Cuban Constitutional reform made very public a 
development that had been ongoing in Cuba for almost a decade 
before.1 That development involved the transformation of 
Leninism2 in a way that made a space—however, tentative—for the 
participation of the collective in the implementation of the 
fundamental political and economic line developed under the 
leadership of the vanguard party which served as the “core” of 
political authority.3 The development of a transformed theory of 
collective and core within Leninist theory has marked one of the 
most remarkable changes in Marxist–Leninist theory since the 
development first of radical collectivity under Mao Zedong’s 
 
1 Mervyn Bain, Cuba’s New Constitution is Embodiment of Island’s Unique Brand of 
Politics, THE GLOBE POST (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://theglobepost.com/2019/03/08/cuba-politics-constitution/. 
2 Though the terms Marxism and Leninism are often used together, almost as a 
single concept, they are actually quite distinct concepts. Marxism might most 
usefully be understood as the normative foundations of political systems 
grounded in a rejection of mass individual ownership of capital and of political 
systems meant to privilege this centering of the division between capital 
ownership and labor. For the well-known but arguably little read classic first 
contemporary iteration, see KARL MARX, CAPITAL (VOLUME 1: A CRITIQUE OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY) (Friedrich Engels, ed., Samuel Moore, Edwards Aveling & 
Ernest Untermann, trans., 2017) (1867). Marxism itself has undergone substantial 
development since its initial development by Karl Marx from an explanation of 
the sociology and politics of economic organization to a set of fundamental 
normative principles through which system (with substantial contextual 
variation) of a political-economic model for the organization of states could be 
undertaken. Leninism on the other hand speaks to the political system necessary 
to replace the system of individual capital ownership and the principles for control 
of the political-economic apparatus of state by a revolutionary vanguard to 
prepare individuals for the establishment of a society grounded in Marxist 
normative principles. See generally LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF 
MARXISM 661-686, 730-777 (P.S. Falla, trans., 2005). 
3 See LARRY CATÁ BACKER, CUBA’S CARIBBEAN MARXISM: ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY, 
GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY IN THE POST FIDEL CASTRO ERA (Little Sir Pub. 
2018). 
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Cultural Revolution.4 That was followed by the equally radical 
technocratization of the vanguard apparatus which sought to 
express the popular collective through an organized and 
responsive set of representative state and non–state organs.5 It was 
this technocratization and institutionalization of consultation that 
has marked the development of Chinese approaches since the time 
of the Reform and Opening Up era of Deng Xiaoping’s socialist 
modernization gloss on Leninist collectivity.6 The result of these 
transformations has been felt within the expression of constitutions 
and constitution making.7 But this is constitution making of a very 
different sort, and one seeking, in its own way, to develop 
structures and principles of democratic governance that accord 
with foundational principles of political organization incompatible 
with those of liberal democratic states and the national cultures it 
advances.  
 
In some sense, all such approaches to democratic ordering must 
deal with the management of the relationship of leadership “cores,” 
and of the “collectives” they serve.8 For Marxist Leninist systems, 
 
4 See, e.g., Jiang Shigong, ‘Philosophy and History: Interpreting the “Xi Jinping 
Era” through Xi’s Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP’ ["哲学
与历史—从党的十九大报告解读“习近平时代”] The China Story (Australian Centre 
on China in the World (CIW) at the Australian National University ) (May 11, 2018) 
(Translation by David Ownby. Notes by Timothy Cheek and David Ownby) 
Permalink HERE); considered in Larry Catá Backer, Reflections on Jiang Shigong on 
“Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ through Xi’s Report to the 
Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP” LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (June 3, 2018), 
https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/reflections-on-jiang-shigong-
on.html#more. 
5 See, e.g., Joseph Fewsmith, Studying the Three Represents, CHINA LEADERSHIP 
MONITOR, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm8_jf.pdf 
(on the reform of the Chinese Communist Party in the era after Mao Zedong).  
6 See, e.g., HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER (2011). 
7 See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG & ALBERTO SIMPSER, CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015) (on constitutions and 
constitution making in illiberal and Marxist-Leninist States from a conventional 
liberal democratic perspective). See, e.g., TONG ZHIWEI, RIGHT, POWER, AND 
FAQUANISM; A PRACTICAL LEGAL THEORY FROM CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Brill, 2018); 
Larry Catá Baker, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and 
the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331-408 
(2012) (for a different perspective). 
8 On the issue of representation in liberal democracies, see, e.g., JOHN GASTIL, BY 
POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH 
42 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 27:1 
 
that relationship is also centered on a dual set of cores and 
collectives; but here the core is also a vanguard party in which all 
political authority is vested, but which as a consequence owes its 
legitimacy to its ability to fulfill its ideologically mandatory 
responsibilities to the collectives they serve.9 This clearly is not 
democracy in the sense that it is understood in liberal democratic 
states.10  
 
Constitutionalism, as the newspapers announce, has 
become the commanding ideology of our time. The 
 
DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (2000) (“There are two fundamental problems in 
American politics. The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected 
officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct.” Id. at 1.); see 
also, e.g., Alessandro Bonnano, The Crisis of Representation: The Limits of Liberal 
Democracy in the Global Era, 16 J. OF RURAL STUD. 305 (2000). See generally, NADIA 
URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PRINCIPLES AND GENEALOGY (2006). On the 
issue of leadership cores and their relationship to collectives in illiberal systems, 
see, e.g., WILLIAM CASE, POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEMOCRACY OR LESS? 245-63 
(2002); see also, XIAOWEI ZANG, ELITE DUALISM AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN CHINA 
35-54 (2004). The issue is ancient in the West. See, e.g., JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE 
IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE (1989); 
see also, WALTER STRUVE, ELITES AGAINST DEMOCRACY: LEADERSHIP IDEALS IN 
BOURGEOIS POLITICAL THOUGHT IN GERMANY, 1890-1933 (1973). 
9 The problem of legitimacy in a political system guided by a vanguard core under 
principles of Leninist institutional organization touches on the sensitive issues of 
“cults of personality.” On cults of personality in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. See Carol Strong & Matt Killingsworth, Stalin the Charismatic Leader?: 
Explaining the ‘Cult of Personality’ as a Legitimation Technique, 12 POL., RELIGION & 
IDEOLOGY 391 (2011). Most interesting is Soviet self-awareness of the issue. See also 
Nikita Khrushchev, Speech to 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (Feb. 24-25, 1956), 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm (denouncing 
the decades long cult of personality around Stalin; (“While ascribing great 
importance to the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the 
same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the 
individual, inexorably combated [any] foreign-to-Marxism views about a ‘hero’ 
and a ‘crowd,’ and countered all efforts to oppose a “hero” to the masses and to 
the people.”). On cults of personality in China and Vietnam, see, Jeremy T. Paltiel, 
The Cult of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist 
Regimes, 16 STUD. IN COMP. COMMUNISM 49 (1983); see also, Larry Catá Backer, 
Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy for China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu 
Angang’s Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese 
Constitutional State, 16 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 29 (2014). And perhaps more 
critically, see, Luwei Rose Luqiu, The Reappearance of the Cult of Personality in China, 
33 E. ASIA 289 (2016). 
10 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, 67 IND. 
L.J. 879 (1992) (discussing the role of Constitutionalism in American democracy). 
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principal alternative model, Communism, is dead, and 
political leaders who used to wave the banner of 
"socialism" to justify authoritarian repression and human 
rights violations are silenced. Virtually every state now 
has a constitution, and every political leader proclaims 
commitment to constitutionalism, to the rule of law.11 
 
Rather in the enhancement of popular participation among 
those who do not belong to the vanguard party. That participation 
is connected to an enhanced role in the implementation and 
organization of the administrative apparatus of the state and the 
implementation of political goals and objectives that have been 
developed under the leadership of the vanguard. Within Marxist-
Leninist political organizations, it does represent a significant 
opening meant to permit popular engagement without appearing 
to signal an (inevitable) movement toward liberal democratic 
organization.12 And, of course, that move toward popular 
participation has been the great challenge of post-Soviet 
Leninism—to develop a robust theory of democratic engagement 
that is sui generis and nationally contextual—without at the same 
time appearing to be just another sad effort to veil an anti-
democratic apparatus (the great failing of the Soviet experiment13 
and the great peril for China.14 For China, the evolution of Leninist 
theory toward popular participation has involved the development 
of the core-collective binary, mediated through the political theory 
of the “mass line” (from the people, to the people),15 as a political 
foundation for the exercise of leadership by the vanguard.16 For 
Cuba, that movement toward democratic ordering has taken its 
Leninist system in a different direction. It is that difference in 
 
11 Id. at 885. 
12 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism in the “New Era”: The 
Constitution in Emerging Idea and Practice, 33 CONN. J. INT’L L. 163 (2018) (discussing 
how China coincides “New Era” Constitutionalism with their socialist structure). 
13 See, e.g., KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 2 at 849-881. 
14 See, e.g., Shannon Tiezzi, The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 27, 2013), https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-
campaign-in-the-21st-century/ (noting the danger of ideological campaigns 
becoming ritualized or a formality). 
15 See, e.g., Graham Young, On the Mass Line, 6 MODERN CHINA 225-240 (1980). 
16 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Jiang Shigong 强世功 on “Written and Unwritten 
Constitutions” and Their Relevance to Chinese Constitutionalism, 40 MODERN CHINA 
119-132 (2014).  
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direction and its connection to principles of popular participation 
in governance that serves as this essay’s the object of examination.  
 
This effort toward the construction (at least in theory) of a 
socialist democracy (the preferred term among its users), of course, 
ought not to be understood as a variation of a lurch toward 
democracy17 within the structures and world views of liberal 
democracies. The fundamental at the core of liberal democratic 
theory that all systems must inevitable transition to liberal 
democratic principles as the highest expression of political 
community,18 tends to serve as the lens through which Chinese 
political and legal theory is understood in the West.19 It informs 
approaches to Cuban engagements with the application of 
democratic principles within the confines of its own normative 
principles.20 
 
Cuba, usually considered a backwater for the development of 
robust Leninist theory, or at least merely a quixotic Caribbean 
variant of East German Sovietism,21 has since 2011 proven to be 
increasingly adept at incorporating aspects of theoretical 
developments of post-Soviet Marxist-Leninist constitutionalism.22 
 
17 Carl Gershman, The New Fight: Cuba and the Movement for Democracy, WORLD 
AFFAIRS JOURNAL, Winter 2016; Antonio Rodiles & Erik Jennische, The Mirage of 
Transition in Cuba (CATO Institute, ECON. DEV. BULLETIN No. 30, June 27, 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/mirage-
transition-cub; Darren Hawkins, Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights 
From Cuba, 33 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 441 (2001). 
18 For purposes of this essay no position is taken on the validity of these premises 
or the value of this belief. The point worth emphasizing here is that ideology tends 
to color analysis of systems grounded in what, to its believers, might be equally 
compelling ideological principles wholly incompatible to those of liberal 
democracy.  
19 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Yan Lin, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking: 
China's Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467 
(Spring 2015). 
20 See, Nick Miroff, Is Cuba on the Verge of Democratic Reform?, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/05/is-
cuba-on-the-verge-of-major-political-reform/. 
21 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Central Planning Versus Markets Marxism: Their 
Differences and Consequences for the International Ordering of State, Law, Politics, and 
Economy, 32 Conn. J. of Int’l L 1 (Fall 2016).  
22 Again, these terms are not meant to be understood in their sense within a liberal 
democratic political model. They are meant, instead, to express the possibility of 
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More importantly it has appeared successful, despite substantial 
resistance from its political enemies abroad, in developing 
mechanisms for its implementation through three cycles of 
political-economic development in the post Fidel Castro Era.23 It 
has also done so despite a singular lack of the sort of robust 
theoretical discussions within its own Communist Party apparatus 
that has marked developments in China. Ironically, the roots of 
Cuba’s own journey toward a form of institutionally embedded 
popular participation (again incomprehensible when measured by 
the premises of Western liberal democracy), lie in the practices of 
the Revolutionary government before it became formally Leninist. 
These roots, grafted onto the structures of formal consultation built 
into the state apparatus after the first Cuban Communist Party 
Congress, have, since 2011, opened the door to what may be 
understood now as Cuba’s efforts at Socialist Consultative 
Democracy 2.0.  
 
It is in that context that the question of the extent to which 
Cuba's authoritarian State is changing or, within some meaningful 
context, changing, and by changing inching toward democracy, 
becomes more interesting. The answer to this question is ‘Yes!’—
but on its own terms.24 The answer is also ‘No!,’ if measured against 
the principles and expectations of liberal democracy.25 To that end, 
consider the early efforts of the post-revolutionary regime to 
develop structures of mass democratic participation under the 
guidance of a leadership core. If we consider the effects of 
 
the recognition and development of democratic principles within the structures of 
Marxist Leninist political model. See Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government, 
and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule 
of Law System, 30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 331 (2012) (for a discussion in the context of Chinese 
Marxist Leninist constitutionalism). 
23 See, e.g., Ramón I. Centeno, The Cuban Regine After a Decade of Raúl Castro in 
Power, 9 MEXICAN L. REV. 99-126 (2017); CARMELO MESA-LAGO & JORGE PÉREZ-
LÓPEZ, CUBA UNDER RAÚL CASTRO: ASSESSING THE REFORMS (2014); Marc Frank, 
Chronology: Raul Castro’s Road to Reform in Cuba, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2011), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-reform-chronology/chronology-raul-
castros-road-to-reform-in-cuba-idUSTRE73C70C20110413. 
24 See Jorge Dominguez, Constitución y Constitucionalismo en Cuba: Introducción al 
Dossier y Reflexiones, CUBAN STUD. 45 (2017): 3-13 (for useful reflections). 
25 See Robert Post & Reva Siegal, Democratic Constitutionalism, Constitution 
Center Whitepaper, available at https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/white-pages/democratic-constitutionalism (for a straightforward 
consensus description).  
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institutionalizing this mechanism for popular participation in the 
tightly managed National Assembly of Popular Power. These 
together, we will suggest, constitute Cuba’s efforts to construct an 
initial form of Socialist Consultative Democracy (the initial or 1.0 
version); an effort that suffered from its own internal failings and 
contradictions. We will then turn to the efforts to build on this 
architecture after 2011 to develop a revised version that drew on 
part practice and experiments and reorganized them in a 
distinctively systematic way. This is what we have called Cuba’s 
Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0,26 the most refined expression 
of which was evidenced in the Cuban Constitutional Reform 
processes of 2018-2019.  
 
We note that the conception of the problem posited, and its 
conceptual evolution that follows is highly theoretical, though 
hopefully not entirely abstract. More importantly, as we will try to 
show, the conceptualization of the problem has generated a 
substantial amount of practical approaches but is still in search of a 
unifying theory compatible with the Cuban political-economic 
model it is meant to serve. We hope to take a step in that direction 
here. To take that step requites, at its core, the recognition of a 
possibility, within Marxist-Leninist political organization, that 
democratic expression might be built along quite different lines 
than that deemed inevitable under the principles of Western liberal 
democracy. That is, that at least in theory, it is possible to try to 
construct system of endogenous democracy—grounded in the 
practice of consultation and approbation—in contradistinction to 
principles of exogenous democracy on which Western liberal 
democracies are founded. Sadly, for Cuba, this theory remains (as 
it tends to in Marxist-Leninist systems) far ahead of practice.  
 
A. The Problem—Developing a Possibility of Popular 
Participation in Illiberal Constitutional States. 
 
 
26 Larry Catá Backer, Flora Sapio, & James Korman, Popular Participation in the 
Constitution of the Illiberal State—An Empirical Study of Popular Engagement and 
Constitutional Reform in Cuba and the Contours of Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0, 34 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).  
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Let us consider the 1st Cuban Communist Party (PCC) 
Congress of 197527 as the template for the ideological and 
constitutional changes that followed from the 7th PCC Congress in 
2016. As we will see in more detail below, most of the structural 
elements of the 7th PCC Congress and the forms of constitutional 
reform that followed were first attempted in the context of the 
development of the PCC's first comprehensive ideological line,28 
and the transposition of that line into the 1976 Cuban constitution. 
In both cases, significant ideological work of the PCC was 
immediately followed by its articulation in the state constitution. 
More importantly, in both cases, the process included a well-
managed intervention of popular engagement and validation. This 
included the solicitation of mass reaction to the circulating drafts of 
key documents and a popular plebiscite.  
 
What was missing from the 2016-2019 reform effort, including 
its constitutional dimension, was what had been a key element of 
popular participation—the organization of mass acclamation at a 
 
27 In Cuba, like China, the Communist Party leadership meets periodically to hear 
reports and to pass on changes to policy and the political line. In China,  
the National Congress draws together selected delegates from 
the CCP's membership base. Attendees are required to elect 
candidates to senior party positions, consider the general 
secretary's report, and decide on amendments to the CCP's 
constitution. While the meeting is the highlight of the Chinese 
political calendar, at which the general line for the CCP is 
established and celebrated, outcomes have already been 
decided before the event, according to Roderic Wye, associate 
fellow of the Asia programme at Chatham House. "The 
Congress is a celebration of decisions that have already been 
taken that we don't know about from the outside [of the party]," 
Wye told Al Jazeera.” 
David Child, Explained: National Congress of China's Communist party, AL JAZEERA 
(Oct. 17, 2017). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/explained-national-
congress-china-communist-party-171017140021234.html.  
28 Within Leninist systems an ideological line includes the policies that will be 
followed as an application of the principles of the political-economic system that 
will be emphasized in a contemporary context. See Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of 
Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the 
“Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29-102 (2006). They have been criticized for the 
tendency within some Marxist-Leninist States to use them as a screen behind 
which the individual discretion of a leading personality is actually the principal 
driver of politics. See, e.g., David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013). 
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rally called for that purpose.29 The 1st PCC Congress and the 
resulting modalities of popular affirmation appeared to mark a 
turning point in the practice of early Caribbean Marxist socialist 
democracy.30 That was the last time that the mechanics of popular 
affirmation were used, and only as a supplement to a more 
conventional use of voting.  
 
Yet mass acclamation played a decisive role in the early stages 
of post-revolutionary Cuba,31 and it has never been rejected as 
inimical to the core ideology of the Cuban Leninism. Popular 
acclamation at large gatherings of the people was a first effort to 
find a way to produce democratic practice that avoided what was 
increasingly seen as the ideologically corrupt system of popular 
voting. It served as the first iteration of a process that sought to do 
two things. The first was to distinguish the forms of democratic 
engagement in Leninist states from that of Western liberal 
democracies. The idea was that conventional voting was itself 
ideologically contaminated with bourgeois principles of class 
exploitation and that an alternative mode of democratic expression 
was needed. The second was to embed principles of class 
struggle—and of the primacy of the worker-revolutionary axis—
into the expression of democratic engagement.32 The development 
 
29 Popular affirmation or acclamation is not unknown in liberal democratic 
systems. For a discussion in the context of plebiscites, see, e.g., LAWRENCE T. FARLEY, 
PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY (Routledge, 
2019). They have been criticized for their tenuous relationship with the legitimacy 
and protections offered by democratic government. See, e.g., REFERENDUM 
DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 
(Matthew Mendelsohn, Andrew Parkin eds. 2001). Plebiscites in other non-liberal 
democratic states have also parallel challenges. See John Londregan & Andrea 
Vindigni, Authoritarian Plebiscites, paper (2008), 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.625.7491&rep=rep1
&type=pdf.  
30 It should be emphasized at this early point that the theory and principles 
underlying Marxist Leninist acts of mass affirmation are built on quite distinct 
principles from those of liberal democratic plebiscites or other forms of mass 
referendum. Indeed, much of the efforts of the Cuban revolutionary government 
was centered on distinguishing its mass affirmations from the practices of liberal 
democratic states. See discussion infra at text and notes.  
31 THE FIRST AND SECOND DECLARATIONS OF HAVANA: MANIFESTATIONS OF 
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE IN THE AMERICAS ADOPTED BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE (Mary-
Alice Waters, ed, 1962).  
32 See, e.g., Building a (Very) New Road to Socialism? Cuba in the 21st Century, NODAL 
NOTICIAS DE AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (Dec. 4, 2017), 
2019 POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM 49 
 
of these mechanisms, of Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy 
1.0, is the object of this section.  
B. The Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba and 
the Origins of the Socialist Plebiscite 1960-1962 
 
The initial approach of the revolutionary government33 to 
resolving the problem of the democratic participation of the 
“collective” in a system developed under the mandatory leadership 
of a ruling “core” was to attempt an exercise in direct sovereign 
democracy by constituting a General National Assembly of the 
Cuban People (Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba).34 
It was used in two instances between 1960 and 1962, and produced 
two key ideological instruments that defined Cuba's external 
relations and the internal structures for the expression of sovereign 
authority. It appeared in vestigial form at the end of the 1st PCC 
Congress as part of a larger effort to create the Party-State 
governance architecture (as the sovereign act of delegating 
authority to both Party and to its popular expression) no longer in 
general mass assemblies but in the institutionalization of the mass 
will in the National Assembly of Popular Power. Yet that transition 
ought not to take away from the importance of the development of 
core political principles around the idea of mass assemblies, the 
suspicion of popular voting, and the conception of the membership 
of the polity that, under the direction of the vanguard, was fit to 





33 It is useful to remember that the revolutionary government established after 
January 1, 1959 was essentially a military government that then slowly 
transformed itself into a military-civilian apparatus whose institutions were not 
formalized until 1976. See, e.g., Irving Louis Horowitz, CUBAN COMMUNISM 482, 
482-511 (Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki eds., 10th ed. 2001). 
34 Tariq Ali, CASTRO: THE DECLARATIONS OF HAVANA vii, xii (Tariq Ali, ed., Verso, 
2018) (In later years Fidel Castro explained that the Havana Declarations: “said 
that an armed struggle: should not be embarked on if there existed legal and 
constitutional conditions for a peaceful civic struggle. That was our thesis in 
relation to Latin America.”). 
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i. First Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba—
2 September 1960.  
The first instance of a practice (however crude) of popular 
direct democratic action appeared at the end of a mass assembly on 
2 September 1960 in Havana.35 It marked the rupture of relations 
with the United States.36 The event is inscribed in the political 
consciousness of the post-revolutionary government in a quite 
specific way: 
 
In a plaza filled with the populace all demonstrating their 
unconditional support for the triumphant Revolution of 
January 1, 1959, there raised a unified powerful voice, 
then Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz made known the 
First Declaration of Havana. That convincing response 
from the Cuban Revolution to the Organization of 
American States (OAS) was then approved unanimously. 
The Cuban people decide to confront the declarations of 
that organization that up to then responds to the interests 
of the United States.37  
 
This was no ordinary gathering of supporters. The mass event 
was quite deliberately framed as a constitutive gathering with 
sovereign effect as a General National Assembly of the Cuban 
People "an unprecedented event in the annals of Latin America, 
[which] was legitimately constituted as a source of democratic 
power, September 2, 1960."38  
 
35 Id. at 79.  
36 Id. at xi.  
37 Fidel Castro: “¡Cuba es el territorio libre de América!”, CUBADEBATE (Sept. 7, 2017), 
http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2017/09/02/fidel-castro-cuba-es-el-
territorio-libre-de-america/#.XVR1E8oXafB (“En una plaza repleta de pueblo que 
demostraba su apoyo incondicional a la Revolución triunfante del 1ero de enero 
de 1959, se levantaba una voz potente, el entonces primer ministro Fidel Castro 
Ruz da a conocer la Primera Declaración de La Habana. Una respuesta convincente 
de la Revolución Cubana a la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) es 
aprobada por unanimidad. El pueblo cubano decide enfrentarse a las 
declaraciones de esta organización que hasta su actualidad responde a los 
intereses de los Estados Unidos.”). 
38 Id. ("Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, suceso inédito en los 
anales de Latinoamérica, fue legítimamente constituida como fuente de derecho 
democrático, 2 de septiembre de 1960."). 
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Two fundamentally important premises were articulated 
around the Havana Declaration of relevance to the issue of 
democratic accountability in (for this case) an emerging Leninist 
system. The first touched on the mechanisms of direct democracy 
in a large modern state. It centered both on the theory of democratic 
action at a mass event, as well as the mechanics for determining 
under what conditions such sovereignty exercising events might be 
understood to exist. This was the immediate problem facing the 
revolutionary government as it sought to confront the need to act. 
The second was a longer-term concern. This centered on the role 
and mechanics of voting, of elections, within a revolutionary state 
suspicious of voting as a technique for class-based domination. 
 
ii. The mechanics of direct democracy.  
With respect to the mechanics of direct democracy, the premise 
of a popular assembly was meant to look both backwards to 
overcome Cuba's past and forwards to provide a model for other 
Latin American (and eventually all developing) states. It was, in its 
own way, self-consciously universal in its pretensions—at least 
with respect to the conditions and realities of Latin America.  
 
Our small homeland today represents interests that go 
beyond our borders. The destiny of our little homeland is 
to be the beacon that enlightens the millions and millions 
of men and women just like us, who in America today 
suffer the same as we suffered yesterday! This glorious 
destiny has touched us and we will be a light that will 
never be extinguished, a light that will become brighter 
each day and whose reflections will reach farther and 
farther on the lands of sister America!39 
 
39 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the People’s 
Assembly (Sept. 2, 1960), 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1960/esp/f020960e.html) (“Nuestra 
patria pequeña representa hoy intereses que se salen de nuestras fronteras. ¡A 
nuestra patria pequeña le ha tocado el destino de ser el faro que ilumine a los 
millones y millones de hombres y mujeres igual que nosotros, que en la América 
sufren hoy lo mismo que nosotros sufríamos ayer! ¡Nos ha tocado ese destino 
glorioso y nosotros seremos una luz que no se apagará nunca, una luz que será 
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It looked backwards by interposing a popular assembly against the 
tradition of what Fidel Castro called the “assembly of sergeants” 
(with reference to the long history of control by the then recently 
overthrown Batista dictatorship).40 It was meant to interpose the 
performance of democratic and sovereign prerogatives through a 
public assembly of people acting on instinct—and also guided with 
respect to the details of its action by and through the leadership of 
the revolutionary (not yet Marxist Leninist) government. That 
government, of course, acquired legitimacy through force of 
arms41—it was important to cement that initial armed legitimacy by 
an expression of assent by a reunion of a group of people large and 
potent enough to have rejected and undone that government (at 
great cost but possible as later experiences in Egypt and Ukraine 
would make clearer).42  
 
It would have been logical that in any meeting of foreign 
ministers Cuba would not be condemned; It would have 
been logical that in any meeting of foreign ministers the 
United States ought to have been condemned for its 
aggressions against a small country. The absurdity was 
that the small country would be condemned by the foreign 
ministers, precisely to serve the designs of the powerful 
aggressor country. And that is what we are going to 
discuss today in this national general assembly of the 
people of Cuba. 
 
First, why is this a general assembly of the people? What 
 
cada día más brillante y cuyos reflejos llegarán cada día más lejos sobre las tierras 
de la América hermana!”). 
40 See generally Louis A. Perez, Army Politics, Diplomacy and the Collapse of the Cuban 
Officer Corps: the ‘Sergeants’ Revolt' of 1933, 6 J. OF LATIN AM. STU 59 (1974). 
41 See, e.g., ARNOLD POMERANS, K. S KAROL, GUERRILLAS IN POWER: THE COURSE OF 
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (Hill & Wang, 1st ed., 1970). 
42 See LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE COLOR REVOLUTIONS (University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012) (on the color revolution in the Ukraine in this context). See REX BRYNEN, 
PETE W. MOORE, BASSEL F. SALLOUKH & MARIE-JOELLE ZAHAR, BEYOND THE ARAB 
SPRING: AUTHORITARIANISM & DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD (Lynn 
Reinner Pub., 2012); Lisa Anderson, Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the 
Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 2-7 (2011) (on 
the Arab Spring in Egypt in this context).  
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does this mean about a general assembly of the people? It 
means, in the first place, that the people are sovereign, that 
is to say that sovereignty is rooted in the people and that 
all powers emerge from it. (Applause). The people of 
Cuba are sovereign. No one could argue that the majority 
of the people are represented here; No one could argue 
that the people are represented here. In the annals of the 
history of our country such a crowd never met; In the 
annals of the history of our country, such an act was never 
seen; in the annals of the history of America such a 
multitude never met; In the annals of the history of 
America a similar act was never seen. (Applause). 
 
We Cubans can speak to America today; We Cubans can 
speak to the world today. A small group of political 
"sergeants" has not gathered here; here a handful of 
mercenaries have not gathered; Here the populace has 
gathered today! (Applause.) Those who want to know 
what a united populace, come and see this! Those who 
want to understand a democratic people, come and see 
this! Those who want to see what a people ruling their 
own destinies, come and see this!; those who want to 
know what a democracy is, come and see this! 43 
 
43 Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“Era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres 
no se fuese a condenar a Cuba; era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres 
se condenase a Estados Unidos por sus agresiones a un país pequeño. Lo absurdo 
era que el país pequeño fuese a ser condenado por los cancilleres, precisamente 
para servir los designios del poderoso país agresor. Y eso es lo que vamos a 
discutir hoy en esta asamblea general nacional del pueblo de Cuba.  
En primer lugar, ¿por qué es esta una asamblea general del pueblo? ¿Qué 
quiere decir esto de una asamblea general del pueblo? Quiere decir, en primer 
lugar, que el pueblo es soberano, es decir que la soberanía radica en el pueblo y 
que de él dimanan todos los poderes (APLAUSOS). El pueblo de Cuba es 
soberano. Nadie podría discutir que aquí está representada la mayoría del pueblo; 
nadie podría discutir que aquí está representado el pueblo. En los anales de la 
historia de nuestra patria jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la 
historia de nuestra patria jamás se vio un acto semejante; en los anales de la historia 
de América jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la historia de 
América jamás se vio un acto semejante (APLAUSOS).  
Los cubanos podemos hoy hablarle a América; los cubanos podemos hoy 
hablarle al mundo. Aquí no se ha reunido un grupito de “sargentos” políticos; aquí 
no se ha reunido un puñadito de mercenarios; ¡aquí se ha reunido hoy el pueblo! 
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And thus, the general national assembly of the people was 
juxtaposed against the assemblies of contemporary democracy and 
dictatorship—the assemblies of states beholden to a great power, 
and the assemblies of national actors beholden to a "primus." 
Against these, which were characterized as mimicking the forms of 
democracy,44 Fidel Castro offered the performance of the masses 
themselves, gathered together in the largest open space in 
Havana—as the incarnation of the genius of the people and vested 
by that reason with the full sovereign authority of the political 
community self-constituted as the Cuban Republic.45 
 
To be clear, the object of that characterization was neither to 
defend it nor to reject it, but rather to hold it up as an important 
moment in the development of Caribbean Marxist notions of what 
in China might have been eventually be come to be understood as 
the mass line.46 But the mass line in Cuba was from the start 
practiced in an entirely different way. Given the nature of the 
revolutionary government—revolution first and political self-
conception after—it makes sense to understand that the 
revolutionary government would first draw on Western principles 
of pure democracy, likely sieved through glimmerings of Rousseau 
(as they might have understood them). 
 
The notion of popular assembly was then generalized as a basic 
theory of democratic governance of states in their external relations. 
To that extent, the ideology began to conflate the notions of popular 
assent with that of the nature of representation in states. The result 
was curious in the sense that it suggested that representation on the 
model of liberal democratic states was no representation at all; and 
that the revolutionary leadership (e.g., vanguard leadership model 
emerging in the post-1959 governance apparatus of Cuba) 
 
(APLAUSOS.) Los que quieran saber lo que es un pueblo reunido, ¡que vengan y 
vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es un pueblo democrático, ¡que vengan y 
vean esto!; los que quieran ver lo que es un pueblo rigiendo sus propios destinos, 
¡que vengan y vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es una democracia, ¡que 
vengan y vean esto!”). 
44 For a discussion of Fidel Castro on liberal democracy, see, e.g., Juan	Carlos	Medel,	
Cuban	Democracy	in	the	Speeches	of	Fidel	Castro,	1959–1976,	11,	2	INT’L.	J.	OF	CUBAN	
STUD.	332	(2019). 
45 Castro Ruz, supra note 39. 
46 See Tiezzi, supra note 14; Young, supra note 15; Backer, supra note 16. 
2019 POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM 55 
 
provided a more authentic model of representative and democratic 
action.  
 
It is a principle, it is an elementary principle of public law, 
that no state official can commit his country in acts of 
international law, if that act does not have the approval of 
the people. A representative of any country does not go to 
an international meeting in its own right. Nobody has the 
right on their own to compromise the international 
conduct of a country, and those who go without 
representing the countries, to compromise the behavior of 
the countries, do not commit such behavior. Any act that 
is done over the sovereign will of the people, is a null act, 
it lacks validity. Therefore, the validity of the declaration 
of Costa Rica does not depend on the will of the foreign 
ministers, it depends on the will of the people, and one 
cannot come to the Cuban people with the story that this 
declaration has any validity merely because they claim to 
represent the peoples, No! We have to prove to ourselves 
that this is the feeling of the people. (Applause) And we 
ask the government of Venezuela, the government of 
Peru, the government of Chile, the government of 
Argentina, the government of Brazil, the government of 
Ecuador, the government of Costa Rica; that is, we ask, 
respectfully, the governments of America to summon 
their peoples in a general assembly and submit to them 
the Declaration of Costa Rica. (Applause).47 
 
47 Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“Es un principio, es un principio elemental de derecho 
público, que ningún puede comprometer a su país en actos de derecho 
internacional, si ese acto no cuenta con la aprobación del pueblo. Un representante 
de cualquier país no va a una reunión internacional por su propio derecho. Nadie 
tiene derecho por su propia cuenta a comprometer la conducta internacional de 
un país, y los que van sin representar a los países, a comprometer la conducta de 
los países, no comprometen tal conducta. Todo acto que se haga por encima de la 
voluntad soberana de los pueblos, es un acto nulo, carece de validez. Por tanto, la 
validez de la declaración de Costa Rica depende no de los cancilleres, depende de 
los pueblos, y al pueblo de Cuba no le pueden venir con el cuento de que esa 
declaración tenga validez, porque ellos dicen representar a los pueblos, ¡no!, a 
nosotros hay que probarnos que ese es el sentimiento de los pueblos (APLAUSOS). 
Y nosotros le pedimos al gobierno de Venezuela, al gobierno de Perú, al gobierno 
de Chile, al gobierno de Argentina, al gobierno de Brasil, al gobierno de Ecuador, 
al gobierno de Costa Rica; es decir, les pedimos, respetuosamente, a los gobiernos 
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That theory was then meant to serve not just the Cuban context, 
but rather, the model for all (small) republics, or at least those who 
were seeking liberation from the constraints of an international 
system that, from the perspective of the Cuban revolutionary 
government, was bound in dependency to a master state. "And he 
who fails to gather together the people, he is not a democrat; he 
who does not consult the people, he is not a democrat; to be a 
democrat one has to consult the people. That only happens in 
Cuba!48 Notice here the intimate connection between mass 
assemblies and the guidance of the vanguard, already well 
developed, though not using the traditional discursive tropes of 
Soviet Leninism . . .  yet.  
 
 iv. The theory of voting in revolutionary governments. 
 But inherent as well in the notion of popular expression in mass 
assemblies, were the notions of authentic democracy and of the role 
of voting and thus of authentic representation). Fidel Castro was at 
pains to describe this to the Assembly itself in September 1960: 
 
And this [assembly] is a representation, because here 
there is no "pucherazo" [vote management by the 
principal parties and connected with “caciquismo”], no 
fraud, no vote buying, no political sergeant, no 
machinery, no bottle, and there is nothing; This is pure! 
(Applause.) This is a democracy free of impurities, free of 
impurities, it is a truly "pasteurized" democracy 
(LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE). And do not tell us that 
the other is more democracy than this; that the democracy 
of the political sergeant, of the "pucherazo", of the bottle, 
of politicking, of bribery, of the purchase of consciences, 
of coercion, of the political machinery, is purer than this. 
Can there be anything purer than a meeting of the whole 
people? (EXCLAMATIONS OF: "No!") Did someone 
 
de América que convoquen a sus pueblos en asamblea general y les sometan la 
Declaración de Costa Rica (APLAUSOS).”). 
48 Id. (“Y el que no reúna al pueblo, el que no reúna al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata!; 
el que no consulte al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata! ¡Para ser demócrata hay que 
consultar al pueblo! (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Eso solo se da en Cuba!”)"). 
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bring the town by force? (EXCLAMATIONS FROM: 
"No!") Did someone pay the town to come? 
(SHOUTING: "No!") The one who came here and is 
passing the work that you are going through, because we 
know that in a crowded crowd there are many people who 
faint, and there are many people . . . ].49  
 
Again, the juxtaposition between what the Cuban government 
painted as a liberal democracy with elaborate forms but no real 
substance against the purity of a direct expression of democratic 
action through assemblies of the masses at which all of the 
perceived deficiencies of the liberal order were absent. But of 
course, this would be possible only because the element of 
spontaneous assembly (something truly revolutionary in the sense 
of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the Arab Spring in Egypt)50 
was avoided. Spontaneous assemblies were revolutionary in the 
sense that their aim was to replace the ruling order. Castro's notion 
that a popular assembly physically assembled could be democratic 
within a revolutionary governance order extend only so far. It is 
legitimacy extended no farther than the ability of the political 
vanguard to manage them. In the case of Cuba, that vanguard 
acquired the legitimate mantle of leadership and the authority to 
guide by virtue of a military triumph.  
 
The text of the Havana Declaration itself elaborated what was 
to be the initial conceptual position of what would emerge as 
Caribbean Marxism. Its sixth paragraph expressed “the conviction 
that democracy cannot consist only in the exercise of an electoral 
vote, which is almost always fictitious and is managed by large 
landowners and professional politicians, but in the right of citizens 
to decide, as now does this General Assembly of the People of 
Cuba, their own destinies. Democracy, moreover, will only exist in 
America when the people are really free to choose, when the 
 
49 Id. (“Y el que no reúna al pueblo, el que no reúna al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata!; 
el que no consulte al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata! ¡Para ser demócrata hay que 
consultar al pueblo! (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Eso solo se da en Cuba!”)"). 
50 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
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humble are not reduced-by hunger, social inequality, illiteracy and 
legal systems-to the most ominous impotence.”51 
 
The position reflects what has crystallized into the well-known 
position, first of the Soviet bloc, and then of developing states with 
respect to the realization of human dignity (expressed in the 
language of rights) and its relationship to the fundamental notion 
of democratic expression through voting and similar mechanisms 
developed at the core of theories of Western liberal democracies. 
That approach is premised on the notion that liberal democracies 
are inherently corrupt because of the effects of economic 
subordination on the free will of voters. As a consequence, 
economic rights are central and paramount to the attainment of 
political rights. Political rights cannot be bootstrapped into 
existence through its mechanics, especially the mechanics of 
elections. As a consequence, centering principles of democracy 
around voting in the absence of economic rights which liberates 
individuals from the effective (direct or indirect) control of 
hierarchy (defined in any number of ways) amounts to a subterfuge 
and the substitution of political theater for democratic politics. 
 
And, of course, what follows is the need for a focus on economic 
rights, the centrality of a leading force installed for that purpose, 
and the central objective of government to guide its people toward 
liberation. Most importantly, it reconstitutes the people (worthy of 
exercising sovereignty) to those already committed to the project of 
economic liberation (understood in the Marxist sense for the most 
part), and excluding all other individuals as unsuitable for the 
exercise of popular sovereignty under the leadership of a "right 
acting" vanguard. 
 
51 Castro Ruz, supra note 39 (“la convicción cubana de que la democracia no puede 
consistir sólo en el ejercicio de un voto electoral, que casi siempre es ficticio y está 
manejado por latifundistas y políticos profesionales, sino en el derecho de los 
ciudadanos a decidir, como ahora lo hace esta Asamblea General del Pueblo de 
Cuba, sus propios destinos. La democracia, además, sólo existirá en América 
cuando los pueblos sean realmente libres para escoger, cuando los humildes no 
estén reducidos — por el hambre, la desigualdad social, el analfabetismo y los 
sistemas jurídicos—, a la más ominosa impotencia.”). 
2019 POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM 59 
 
 
 v. Second Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de 
Cuba—4 February 1962. 
 The Second National General Assembly was organized on 4 
February 1962, in response to yet another international rebuff of the 
Cuban revolutionary government by other Latin American states. 
Specifically, the trigger was the action taken by the OAS at its 
January 1962 meeting, at which the organization voted for 
additional sanctions against Cuba, the day after U.S. President 
Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 3447, more firmly 
establishing what then became known as the Cuban Embargo.52 
"Today, this General Assembly is meeting for the second time, as a 
sovereign organ of the will of the Cuban people; and meets to give 
full response to the maneuver, the scheme, the plot of our enemies 
in Punta del Este.”53  
  
The event and its context, then, assumes a fundamental place 
within the development of the principles and orientations of the 
Cuban state both internally and in its relationship with its 
neighbors. Those principles, and the context in which they arose, 
also resonated with the Cuban leadership and their allies in the 
Caribbean, in the midst of the 7th PCC Congress and the 
development of the Reconceptualization Of The Political And Economic 
Model along with the constitutional reform that necessarily 
followed. In 2017, an official Cuban organ noted: 
 
 
52 PATRICK J. HANEY & WAT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: THE DOMESTIC 
POLITICS OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 18 (U. Pittsburgh Press, 2005) (discussing 
the origins of the Cuban Embargo). But see Ted Henkin & Archibald Ritter, 
Overcoming Cuba's Internal Embargo, CURRENT HISTORY, Feb 2015, at 73 (discussing 
what has been referenced as Cuba’s internal embargo). 
53 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the Second 
National Assembly (Feb. 4, 1962) (transcript available at: 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1962/esp/f040262e.html) (“Se reúne 
por segunda vez, con carácter de órgano soberano de la voluntad del pueblo 
cubano, esta Asamblea General en el día de hoy; y se reúne para dar cabal 
respuesta a la maniobra, a la conjura, al complot de nuestros enemigos en Punta 
del Este."); see generally William Tell, Segunda Declaración de La Habana: Por su Única, 
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More than a million Cubans filled the Plaza de la 
Revolución [formerly the Plaza de la República] 
answering the call for assembly made by the 
Revolutionary Government for the purpose of 
constituting the Second National General Assembly of the 
People, which approved the Second Declaration of 
Havana, which reaffirmed our dignity as a free, 
independent and sovereign nation, while proclaiming the 
projection and Latin Americanist vocation of the Cuban 
Revolution.54 
 
That was certainly echoed by the friendly elements of the then 
government of Venezuela through its press organs: “With the 
passage of time the [2nd Declaration of Havana] has become a true 
affirmation of principles advancing. Over the years, the Declaration 
became a true affirmation of principles, in favor of the projection 
and Latin American character of the Cuban Revolution with a deep 
respect for the socialist and internationalist character of the Cuban 
political process.55  
 
One of the most interesting elements of the Second General 
National Assembly was the way in which it affirmed the notion of 
people grounded in class and political solidarity in a way that 
effectively permitted the reconstitution of "the people" without 
respect to nationality. “With us there are many Latin Americans 
who visit our country or participated in the Peoples Conference in 
Havana (applause), but they should not be just spectators. We 
propose to the National General Assembly of the People that Latin 
Americans not be spectators, but also have the right to vote along 
with the people of Cuba, the Declaration of Havana (PROLONGED 
APPLAUSE AND EXCLAMATIONS OF: "Fidel, Fidel!").56 This 
 
54 Tell, supra note 53 (“más de un millón de cubanos colmaron la Plaza de la 
Revolución al llamado que hiciera el Gobierno Revolucionario para constituir la 
Segunda Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo, la cual aprobó la Segunda 
Declaración de La Habana, que reafirmó nuestra dignidad como nación libre, 
independiente y soberana, al tiempo que proclamaba la proyección y vocación 
latinoamericanista de la Revolución Cubana.”). 
55 Cuba celebra los 55 años de la II declaración de La Habana, TELESUR (Feb. 4, 2017), 
https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cubacelebra-los-55-anos-de-la-II-declaracion-
de-La-Habana-20170202-0032.html. 
56 Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech delivered at the Second 
National Assembly (Feb. 4, 1962). 
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provided the kernel of the union of mass national solidarity with 
regional integration that many decades later found expression in 
the Socialist Regionalism of the Cuba-Venezuela lead Bolivarian 
Alliance. 57 
 
The focus was not anarchic. Rather it furthered the emerging 
principles of Latin American solidarity at the heart of Caribbean 
Marxism.58 That solidarity posited a common supra-sovereign 
alignment of Latin American states in opposition to the United 
States and its purported domination of the hemisphere: 59 “No Latin 
American people are weak, because they form part of a family of 
200 million brothers who share the same miseries, harbor the same 
sentiments, and have the same enemy, who all dream of a better 
destiny, and which count on the solidarity of all honest men and 
women worldwide."60 
 
Taken together, the two General National Assemblies produced 
an ideological urtext from which the PCC would find it difficult to 
reject. The revolutionary government had acquired popular 
legitimacy through victory in an armed conflict joined only by a 
minority of Cubans. Such a legitimacy, however, had to be 
sanctioned by a meeting large enough to allow those in attendance 
to either approve or the revolutionary government, or else to undo 
it. By obtaining affirmations of approval at the two Havana rallies, 
the armed nucleus of the Cuban Revolution posited itself not only 
as the political representative of the people, but as its acting core.  
  
 The Cuban Revolution had rejected notions of political 
representation by candidates from competing parties chosen 
through the casting of ballots. Such a rejection was based on the 
vulnerability of electoral processes to exogenous and endogenous 
interference. Electoral fraud, intervention by agents of foreign 
governments and by economic lobbies, the adverse impacts of 
socio-economic malaise on popular awareness of and engagement 
 
57 See generally, Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of 
Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 679 (2010). 
58 This was a theme well developed in the speeches of Fidel Castro. See, e.g., Fidel 
Castro, De Seattle al 11 de Septiembre 101-129 (Txalaparta ed., 2002). 
59 See Backer & Molina, supra note 57. 
60 Id. 
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in governance were seen as factors impeding the formation and 
manifestation of a truly free will. To these perceived ills, the 
revolutionary government found the antidote of collective 
decision-making through acclamation.  
  
 The resulting demos—as opposed to the ochlos 61—was 
defined not along the lines of class divisions, in a Marxist sense. In 
a more classically Socialist fashion, political citizenship belonged to 
those willing to eliminate all the factors leading to economic and 
social subordination, achieve individual and collective self-
determination, and who supported the endeavors of the more 
active nucleus of the Cuban Revolution. Such a conception of the 
demos was transnational, as political citizenship was earned not by 
virtue of legal citizenship, but by the mere belonging to any of the 
social groups bearing the negative externalities of regional 
economic and social development policies, and by a rejection of 
such an individual and collective condition. Political citizenship cut 
across the lines of national borders, ideologies and structures of 
governance, including persons born in Latin America, but also – 
ideally – U.S. citizens, and persons living in other continents. If 
participation to mass rallies granted political citizenship, then such 
participation could not be entirely spontaneous. Exclusion of those 
unwilling to participate in the Revolution was proven by 
nonattendance to the rallies convened in the 1960s.62 More 
 
61 See Peter J. Fliess, Political Disorder and Constitutional Form: Thucydides’ Critique of 
Contemporary Politics, 21 U. Chicago J. Pol. 592 (1959); cf. Jasmin Hasanović, 
Ochlocracy the Practices of Civil Society: A Threat for Democracy?, 2 STUDIA JURIDICA 
ET POLITICA JAURINENSIS, 56 (2015) (discussing demos versus ochlos (the people 
versus the mob). 
62 Cf. Mao Zedong’s principle of democratic dictatorship:  
Who are the "people"? At the present stage in China, they are 
the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the 
national bourgeoisie. You are dictatorial." My dear sirs, what 
you say is correct. That is just what we are. All the experiences 
of the Chinese people, accumulated in the course of successive 
decades, tell us to carry out a people's democratic dictatorship. 
This means that the reactionaries must be deprived of the right 
to voice their opinions; only the people have that right. Under 
the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, 
these classes unite to create their own state and elect their own 
government so as to enforce their dictatorship over the 
henchmen of imperialism—the landlord class and bureaucratic 
capitalist class, as well as the reactionary clique of the 
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important was avoiding that manifestations of direct democracy be 
polluted by the intervention of the same interests and forces who 
could manipulate conventional electoral processes.  
 
 This is not the only reason why rallies had to be organized by 
the active nucleus of the Revolution. During the Havana 
plebiscitarian meetings Fidel Castro, who was then the Prime 
Minister of Cuba, explained the reasons that had led to the drafting 
of the First and Second Havana Declaration. In liberal-democratic 
systems, national governments are accountable to parliaments, and 
subject to their oversight. Notions of Socialist democracy in Cuba 
were, and still are, fundamentally different. The liberal-democratic 
concept of accountability is replaced by responsibility of the active 
part of the Revolution towards every one of its components. The 
revolutionary core bears the duty of guiding the people towards 
the path of development chosen by them, acting on its behalf. It is 
within the concept of responsibility that mass rallies acquire their 
importance, because they provide the venue to express agreement 
towards concrete methods of revolutionary guidance, or tits 
contrary.  
 
 Finally, from its very onset Cuba’s Socialist democracy had 
a transnational element. The mass plebiscites held on the then Civic 
Square were meant to provide a model to be followed by other 
Latin-American states, and more generally speaking, by the 
economically and socially disempowered. The two sessions of the 
National General Assembly had not only produced an ideological 
urtext where popular affirmation played a fundamental role in 
legitimating the authority of the revolutionary core. They had also 
developed a first nucleus of principles of “socialist democracy” in 
 
Kuomintang, which represents these classes, and their 
accomplices. The people's government will suppress such 
persons. It will only permit them to behave themselves 
properly. It will not allow them to speak or act wildly. Should 
they do so, they will be instantly curbed and punished. The 
democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the 
people, giving them freedom of speech, assembly and 
association. The right to vote is given only to the people, not to 
the reactionaries. These two things, democracy for the people 
and dictatorship for the reactionaries, when combined, 
constitute the people's democratic dictatorship.  
Mao Zedong, The People’s Democratic Dictatorship (June 30, 1949). 
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a Caribbean context, which anti-establishment movements in 
neighboring states would soon embrace.63 Even though 
plebiscitarian meetings no longer took place after 1962, the 
plebiscite remained as a latent possibility in Cuba’s governance 
system. 
 
More importantly, however, the participation urtext, grounded 
in the essential role of popular affirmation as the fundamental 
device for legitimating the authority of the vanguard, opened the 
possibility that this mass popular assembly might one day not approve.64 
But at the same time, it pressed the principle of vanguard guidance 
to constrain the discretion of mass assemblies. And it substantially 
boxed in the breadth of popular action by limiting its exercise to 
those who were already committed to the revolutionary enterprise, 
starting with the objects of class struggle: workers, peasants, and 
aligned intellectuals. “From then the socialist character of the 
Revolution had been declared, there had been a rupture of relations 
with the United States, the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and the 
creation of the single [vanguard] party, first called Revolutionary 
Integrated Organizations (ORI) and then United Party of the Cuban 
Socialist Revolution (PURSC)."65 
 
63 Eduardo Rey Tristán, La izquierda revolucionaria uruguaya, 1955-1973, in 435 
PUBLICACIONES DE LA ESCUELA DE ESTUDIOS HISPANOAMERICANOS 288 (Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 2005). 
64 This was, of course, always the danger of physical presence in mass rallies. 
Theoretically, though, such loss of control would have been unthinkable, and 
practically, the vanguard would have ensured that the “right people” all properly 
instructed and managed and minded, would be in attendance. For a discussion of 
the way in which these mass rallies were organized in Cuba before 1976, see, e.g., 
Gerald Popiel, Pachanga Si!: Two Months in Castro’s Cuba, 41(2) THE DALHOUSIE 
REVIEW 139, 151 (1961) (“At the rallies I sensed that I was witnessing a seance in 
which a strange intimacy was being enacted. These rallies are like tribal 
conclaves”). But this tension between theory and the mechanics of its execution 
produced the sort of contradiction that can be used to discredit this form of 
democratic expression. Some of those critiques also spill over into the referendum 
and plebiscite forms of liberal democracy, especially in the context of the “new” 
populism. See, e.g., Paul Lewis et al., Revealed: the rise and rise of populist rhetoric, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-
interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric; cf., 
MARCO REVELLI, THE NEW POPULISM: DEMOCRACY STARES INTO THE ABYSS (David 
Broder, trans., Verso Books, 2019). 
65 In the original: “Para entonces había sido declarado el carácter socialista de la 
Revolución, se había producido la ruptura de relaciones con Estados Unidos, la 
invasión de Bahía de Cochinos y la creación del partido único, primero llamado 
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But as well, out of the second General Popular Assembly and 
the 2nd Havana Declaration emerged the kernels of what by 1975 
would provide the core structures of Caribbean Leninism, one that 
marches decisively away from the forms of popular direct 
democracy while attempting to maintain its ideological legitimacy. 
The device of the popular mass assembly did not wither on the 
vine, but was instead the object of experimentation to tame it, to 
domesticate it, to make it more useful as a mechanism for the 
legitimization of the leadership and guidance of the vanguard 
party with respect to operationalization of its political line through 
state organs. That experimentation reached its most refined point 
in the construction of Asamblea Nacionales prototypes in the 
provinces after the end of the 1960s. But before then it manifested 
itself in the revolutionary government's constant efforts to "bottle 
the genie" of popular affirmation in more pragmatically aligned 
instruments:  
 
The accelerated transition from a brief experience of 
direct democracy to a first communist-type 
institutionalization on the island was accompanied by the 
creation of a set of mass organizations-neighborhood 
committees, peasant, youth and women's associations, 
trade unions . . . , that governmentalized Cuban civil 
society. This [governmentalized] institutionalization was 
still precarious during the 60s and was constantly 
destabilized by the twists of the changing economic 
policy of the revolutionary government in that decade.”66 
 
Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas (ORI) y luego Partido Unido de la 
Revolución Socialista de Cuba (PURSC).” Rafael Rojas, La Soledad Constitucional 
Del Socialismo Cubano, FIU Steven J. Green School of International & Public Affairs 




66 In the original: “El tránsito acelerado de una breve experiencia de democracia 
directa a una primera institucionalización de tipo comunista, en la isla, se dio 
acompañado de la creación de un conjunto de organizaciones de masas –comités 
vecinales, asociaciones campesinas, juveniles y femeninas, sindicatos…-, que 
vertebró estatalmente la sociedad civil cubana. Dicha institucionalidad fue todavía 
precaria durante los años 60 y se vio constantemente emplazada por los giros de 
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The resulting search for a means of producing representative 
government along Caribbean Leninist lines would prove to be a 
longer-term project.  
 
Connecting the device of General National Assemblies to the 
popular constitutive actions around the 1st PCC Congress in 1975 
and the approval of the 1976 constitution requires the development 
of devices that were meant to solve the ultimate problem that this 
mechanism ultimately presented a maturing revolutionary 
government—a problem that has confronted all government based 
on popular sovereignty—that of efficiency. Like other similarly 
constituted states, the Cuban revolutionary government would 
eventually choose the path of representative mass democracy. But 
it would be one that required two distinct levels to reconcile its 
operations to the core postulates of Leninist government. The fist 
layer would have to consist of the classical Leninist theory of 
vanguard party power; with the vanguard party understood to 
incarnate and represent the political will of the nation. At the same 
time, the masses would have to be reconstituted in representative 
form so that they might be assembled efficiently and managed 
effectively. To that end one moves from the assembly of the masses 
in 1962 to the construction of the national assembly of popular 
power, a subject which we take up next.  
 
vi. Caveats.  
The analysis must be understood within the peculiar context of 
the Cuban national situation. Four are especially worth keeping in 
mind as one moves from pragmatics efforts to a theory of 
affirmation within Cuban Leninism. First, it is possible to reduce 
the two Havana Declarations to Agit-Prop.67 That is, the most 
important enduring element of the Havana Declarations were their 
theatrics. More specifically, the Havana Declarations could be 
 
la cambiante política económica del gobierno revolucionario en aquella década.” 
Rojas, supra note 65; cf. LUIS M. BUCH, GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO. GÉNESIS 
Y PRIMEROS PASOS (La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2001). 
67 Agit-Prop, of course, has been a mainstay of the radical left for over a century, 
even though the technique has no specific ideology as such. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, 
Agitprop in Soviet Russia, 14, CONSTRUCTING THE PAST 5, 5-8 (2013) (“Agitprop 
theatre had one explicit purpose: to reach the working class directly.”).  
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reduced to two quite specific and temporally constrained 
objectives. On the one hand, they might be understood as the 
production of propaganda to manage masses internally, one that 
was effectively abandoned after 1962 except for its historically 
useful propaganda effect.68 At the same time the Havana 
Declarations might be understood as a means toward the projection 
of images of democracy that are meant to target influential Western 
intellectuals and the popular press. Castro had a love affair with 
Western intellectuals—and that affair required a certain amount of 
courtship.69 The Havana Declarations fit right into the cultivation 
of the semi-savage post-colonial peoples that so titillated the 
intellectual predilections of the upper levels of the intelligentsia 
and journalist classes.  
 
Second, the Havana Declaration might not point so much to the 
development of a new approach to Leninist collectivism through a 
mechanics of vanguard-led affirmation as much as it pointed to a 
reactionary element in the pre-Marxist Cuban revolutionary 
government. Indeed, the choice of a public spectacle in the capital 
more resembled the now anachronistic blood ritual affirmations 
around the guillotine of the French Terror then it did the 
revolutionary Leninist mechanics of managing socialist democratic 
impulses (even in the 1960s).70 As an experiment, then, it looked 
backwards rather than forward and could not have survived the 
 
68 “We are the people of the second Havana Declaration, which we did not copy 
from any document, but which was the pure expression of the profoundly 
revolutionary and highly internationalist spirit of our people.” Fidel Castro Ruz, 
Statement on Cuba Chinese Relations (Feb. 6, 1966), available at 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1966/19660206.html.  
69 For a discussion of the cultivation of Western intellectuals by the PCC, see, e.g., 
KEPA ARTARAZ, CUBA AND WESTERN INTELLECTUALS SINCE 1959 (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009); Carlos Alberto Montaner, The Cuban revolution and its acolytes, 
31 SOCIETY, no. 5, 1994, at 73. 
70 See generally Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan 
Sheridan, trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). More interesting might be the 
inspiration drawn either from the great spectacles in the Soviet Union (and China 
in the 1950s), to the show trials of the 1930s, or their fascist counterparts. See, e.g., 
Chang-Tai Hung, Mao's Parades: State Spectacles in China in the 1950s, 190 CHINA Q. 
411 (2007); Valentina G. Lebedeva, Totalitarian and Mass Elements in Soviet Culture 
of the 1930s, 42 RUSSIAN STUDIES IN HISTORY, no. 2, 2003, at 66; James von Geldern, 
Putting the masses in mass culture: Bolshevik Festivals, 1918-1920, 31 JOURNAL OF 
POPULAR CULTURE, 123, 123-144 (1998); Jeffrey T. Schnapp, 18 BL: Fascist Mass 
Spectacle, 43 REPRESENTATIONS 89, 89 (1993). 
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transposition of Leninism into the Revolutionary government over 
the next decade. Moreover, the device is anachronistic in the sense 
that it gives the Capital disproportionate weight. Lastly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the device carried with it a danger of 
conflation with bourgeoisie mechanisms where the Revolutionary 
government was looking for something distinctive. To that end the 
affirmation rather than the voting element of the technique would 
require another half century of development.  
 
Third was the problem of the democratic character of the 
affirmation exercise represented in the Havana Declarations. These 
can be understood in several dimensions. First, who are these 
people who showed up in the square in Havana? Certainly, they 
were citizens of the capital and surrounding places; also likely were 
a group of people transported to the capital from all over Cuba by 
the revolutionary government.71 But was this enough to make the 
affirmation either special or democratically authentic? That is a 
harder question with no satisfactory answer. Second, as a tool of 
government the exercise of the Havana Declarations posed a 
logistical nightmare. Even all of the people packed into the square 
in central Havana would have to serve as a representative of rather 
than as a manifestation of all of the people. But there is little to 
guide the authenticity of that representative element. And no one 
suggested the lunacy of gathering the Cuban people even in as 
large a square as that set aside for this exercise in Havana. Lastly, 
the role of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and 
other mass organizations might both expose the “guiding role” of 
the revolutionary government and also weaken their claim to a 
spontaneity and congregation of people.72  
 
Lastly, this form of affirmation foreclosed any engagement. 
Affirmation negates the possibility of any form of discursive space. 
The nature of affirmation is yes-no-silence. With the focus on 
affirmation, even “no” becomes difficult as the disciplinary power 
of the mob to silence dissent becomes a powerful element of the 
 
71 See e.g. JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION (Harvard University 
Press, 1978); see e.g. RICHARD FAGEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE 
IN CUBA (Stanford University Press, 1969). 
72 See e.g. Richard R. Fagen, Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism of Struggle, 
20(2) J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS 254, 269-71 1966; see generally LUIS SALAS, SOCIAL CONTROL 
AND DEVIANCE IN CUBA (Praeger Publishers, 1979).  
2019 POPULAR CONSULTATION AND REFERENDUM 69 
 
exercise. The result is a flattening of discussion. There can be no 
effort within this affirmation exercise to theorize, much less 
consider, Vanguard obligations respecting these “affirmations.” 
But discussion was not what the revolutionary government was 
after. Affirmation, then is nicely detached from and serves a 
different purpose from engagement either with or through the 
vanguard party.  
 
In the end, though, what emerges clearly here is a technique 
with possibilities. It has the possibility of cloaking revolutionary 
actions of a vanguard with a democratic cover. It can connect the 
vanguard directly to the people. It offers a means of popular 
participation that could be distinguished from bourgeoisie (or 
capitalist system) political elections. And it could reaffirm the 
guiding leadership role of what would emerge as the Communist 
Party of Cuba in the years leading to the First PCC Congress in the 
mid-1970s, a subject to which we turn next.  
C. From the Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba 
to the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular; Situating 
Popular Assent Within an Institutional Cage, 1962-1976. 
 
For the Cuban state, the second Havana Declaration marked the 
last time the revolutionary government used the mechanism of 
assembly this way. Between the beginning of 1962 and the mass 
activities around the development of the ideological documents 
approved in the 1st PCC Congress in 1975 there were many 
assemblies of the masses in the Plaza de la Revolución.73 But those 
assemblies were rallies and not constitutive in any sense. But of 
course, it was for the vanguard to determine the character of the 
assembly—to an outsider it would have been hard to distinguish a 
large mass rally from the constitutive assemblies held in 1960 and 
1962. The key to both was not the assembly itself but the invocation 
of its sovereign character, not by the masses themselves, but by its 
vanguard, those with the authority to assemble the people in this 
way. 
 
73 See FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, FIDEL CASTRO READER, 483-98 (David Deutschamn & 
Deborah Shnookal, eds., Ocean press, 2008); William M. LeoGrande, The Theory 
and Practice of Socialist Democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of Elite Accountability, 12 
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM 39, 48 (1979). 
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Viewed in this way, even at this stage, the Cuban revolutionary 
government was feeling its way toward Leninist governance 
principles combined with Marxist political principles.74 That 
journey was grounded in class struggle in which the only people 
who mattered were the proletarian and the revolutionary worker 
cadres (the Cuban "militantes" nodding toward the military focus 
of the initial success). What was emerging was a consistency in 
mechanics: it was clear that a sort of corporatist "active-passive" 
principle had been embraced. That is, the principle of popular mass 
action could not be self-invoked, it acquired its constitutive 
character only as a result of the call to assembly by the vanguard. 
And that call could only be understood as effective when exercised 
only by the people, which were understood, in turn to include only 
those leading forces of society in solidarity with the principles of 
the revolution and the leadership of the revolutionary government. 
The circle is complete. 
i. Constraining popular power within a cage of 
representative institutionalization.  
It is against this ideological backdrop that the revolutionary 
government slowly confronted the issue of its institutionalization. 
Like all revolutionary governments, the Cuban governing 
apparatus was brought face to face with the contradictions of its 
principles as a revolutionary party against the realities of running 
a state.75 And like the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolutionary 
government made a number of choices that brought into tension its 
earlier core ideologies and the allurements of an ideology, not of a 
nomenklatura76 (for that had already progressed prodigiously 
between 1962 and 1976) but of the vessel for popular affirmation of 
vanguard policy to then be sent back to the vanguards cadres 
 
74 See e.g. SHELDON B. LISS, FIDEL!: CASTRO’S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT, 47-54 
(Westview Press, 1994). 
75 Nicholas Boline, Fidel Castro's Grand Strategy in the Cuban Revolution: 1959-1968, 
PAPERS & PUBLICATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, 2015; 
see also Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution: The Overthrow of Tzarism and the 
Triumph of the Soviets, 477 (F.W. Dupree, ed., Max Eastman, trans., Doubleday, 
1932). 
76 See, e.g., MICHAEL VOSLENSKY, NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS (1984).  
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placed strategically within the administrative apparatus of the 
state.77 
 
For the revolutionary government that required a progression 
from revolutionary government to socialist state, with respect to 
which Fidel Castro sought to cast in as good a light as possible. “In 
this transcendental and historical act, of which we are all living 
witnesses, the provisional period of the Revolutionary Government 
ceases and our definitive institutional forms are adopted by our 
socialist State. The National Assembly is constituted as the supreme 
organ of the State and assumes the functions assigned to it by the 
Constitution. It was a duty and it is at the same time a great triumph 
of our generation to reach this goal."78 
  
 The official history suggests an organic progress from a 
revolutionary state in which all authority had to be concentrated in 
the hands of a single vanguard to a position of stability that at last 
permitted the revolutionary vanguard to seek to institutionalize its 
governance through representative organs under its leadership.79 
The necessities of dismantling the structures and operations of U.S. 
(primarily) colonialism (as they characterized the relationship) and 
the need to develop new structures created a context in which the 
revolutionary government took for itself all of the powers of state.80 
It “decreed revolutionary laws, expropriated the exploiters 
property, and developed basic social mutations, successfully 
carried out the political struggle against external and internal 
aggression. Supported overwhelmingly by the people, the 
 
77 See, e.g., DANIEL N. NELSON, STEPHEN WHITE (EDS.), COMMUNIST LEGISLATURES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (MacMillan 1982). 
78 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the 
National Assembly of Popular Power (Dec. 2, 1976) (available at: 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html) ("En este 
acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el 
período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado 
socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye 
en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución. 
Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta 
meta."). 
79 See, e.g., Aviva Chomsky, A History of the Cuban Revolution, WILEY 40-51 (2nd ed. 
2015). 
80 On the mechanics of government before 1976 in Cuba, see, e.g., William M. 
LeoGrande, The Politics of Revolutionary Development: Civil-Military Relations in 
Cuba, 1959–1976, 1 J. OF STRATEGIC STUD. 260, 260-294 (1978). 
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revolutionary government promoted in this period vast and deep 
political, economic, social and cultural transformations in Cuban 
life."81 But, of course, it was not clear that it was either a duty or a 
triumph; or if it was, whether it was to a large extent a fulfilled of 
the ideological promises of the earliest period of revolutionary 
governance. More importantly, it was not entirely true—as the 
revolutionary government used that period to develop and apply 
principles of mass popular approval as the fundamental modality 
for ratification of their actions. 
 
Yet that process of democratic ratification was actually 
undertaken only twice; the rhetoric of ratification remained far 
more potent than its application. And that augured another 
conundrum for the government: it could not abandon its core 
ideological notion of popular ratification at mass events; such 
undertakings, however, had been reserved for extraordinarily 
events; that left unanswered questions about the scope of any 
obligation to seek popular (mass) acclamation. If the scope of 
mandatory popular affirmation was broad, then a mechanism 
would have to be developed for the institutionalized invocation of 
the popular will (its affirmation power). However, to the extent that 
this would require devolving that popular power to an institution, 
it would raise the issue of popular representation in such a body. 
But to approach that question was also to confront the companion 
ideological constraint made explicit in the two Havana 
Declarations—specifically the ideological line that traditional 
voting mechanisms were corrupted by the ideology of liberal 
democracies and would tend to lead to systemic corruption in the 
sense that it would create incentives towards class-based 
dominance. 
 
Moreover, even if one could solve that problem, the 
fundamental problem of the relationship of this mechanism for 
popular assent to the leadership responsibilities of the PCC would 
 
81 In the original: “El “dictó las leyes revolucionarias, expropió a los explotadores, 
desarrolló básicas mutaciones sociales, llevó a cabo con éxito la lucha política 
frente a las agresiones externas e internas. Apoyado masivamente por el pueblo, 
el gobierno revolucionario impulsó en este período vastas y hondas 
transformaciones políticas, económicas, sociales y culturales en la vida cubana." 
Asamblea Nacional Der Poder (2018), 
https://www.ecured.cu/Asamblea_Nacional_del_Poder_Popular. 
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have to be theorized and also operationalized within the 
institutional structures created. That relationship, in turn, might be 
based on principles of active rather than passive power already 
inherent in the relationship between the revolutionary government 
and the Asambleas General Nacional. And yet, it might also require 
something more than a simple affirmation of work done elsewhere. 
It was necessary, then, also to consider the extent to which such an 
institutionalized voice of popular affirmation might also be avenue 
for review and interaction (here with an institutionalized voice of 
the people) of the legislative and policy guidance received from the 
PCC.  
 
By the early 1970s, a determination was made that there was a 
need to streamline the process of popular approval of fundamental 
acts not otherwise reserved to the administrative machinery.82 The 
constitution of mass assemblies like the Asambleas General 
Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba of the early 1960s was ideologically 
ideal but practically impossible for the business of acquiring a 
constant and uniform and predictable approval of leadership 
guidance by the PCC. At the same time, the idea of engagement 
was thought useful—the idea that popular deep engagement in the 
formulation of the actions to be affirmed doubled the instance of 
popular investment in the work of the state and cemented the 
theoretical requirement of popular involvement in the operation of 
the state. To that end, the PCC developed a new model for reform 
that was to have a substantial impact on the way in which it 
understood and practiced what was to become Caribbean Marxist 
Socialist democracy. 
 
ii. A Transition from a Revolutionary to a Marxist-
Leninist State Institution Requires a Constitution to 
 
82 See, e.g., Fidel Castro Ruz, Formation of the Cuban Communist Party and Che’s 
Farewell Letter (Oct. 3, 1965), in FIDEL CASTRO READER 275-292 (David Deutschamnn 
and Deborah Shnookal, eds., 2008); see also, Lourdes Casal, On Popular Power: The 
Organization of the Cuban State During the Period of Transition, 2 LATIN AMERICAN 
PERSP. 78, 78-88 (1975). 
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Memorialize the Transition: Theorizing Popular 
Participation in Constitutional Reform in Cuba. 
 Cuba was essentially without a formal constitution (though not 
without a form of basic law) from just after the establishment of the 
post-Batista government in 1959, its transformation into a Marxist-
Leninist form of government in the early 1960s, and its 
development during the first 15 years of its existence.83 The 
adoption of the first post-revolutionary constitution marked the 
formal establishment of an autonomous (of sorts) PCC under the 
strong direction of its core—the PCC's First Secretary (Fidel Castro) 
and the PCC Central Committee—and the celebration of its first 
PCC Congress.84  
 
 The first PCC Congress adopted what in retrospect have 
remained the core organizing documents of the political and 
economic systems that remains the operational base of its society.85 
These resolutions framing the core premises of the political and 
economic order were then to be transposed into a state 
constitution.86 That state constitution was then itself to be the object 
through which the masses would be informed of the political 
principles around which the state was organized, and also to 
provide the masses with an opportunity to engage with those 
principles. 
 
The First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba 
considers that the text perfected by the Central 
Preparatory Commission with the contributions of public 
and popular discussion of the Draft Constitution, based on 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism, serves the firm 
decision of our Party and our [proletariat] to endow our 
country with a Socialist Constitution that, because it 
 
83 See, e.g., Max Azicri, The Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political 
Perspective, 22 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 315, 315-344 (1980). 
84 See, e.g., William M. LeoGrande, Party Development in Revolutionary Cuba, 21 J. OF 
INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 457, 457-480 (1979). 
85 See, e.g., Michael B. Wise, Cuban Constitutionalism: Will There Be Changes, 51 DUQ. 
L. REV. 467, 467 (2013); Michael Bognan, Thrity Years of Cuban Revolutionary Law, 15 
REV. SOCIALIST L. 319 (1989). 
86 See, e.g., Edward Gonzales, Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy, 25 PROBS. 
COMMUNISM 1 (1976); L.B. Klein, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (1978). 
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corresponds to the realities and needs of the construction 
of socialism, is an inviolable norm for the actions of all, 
both the organs of the State, its leaders, officials and 
employees, as of each citizen in particular; be a sure 
foundation of the rise and consolidation of socialist 
legality. . . . The First Congress of the Communist Party 
of Cuba, in consequence, gives its approval to the 
improved text of the Draft Constitution and recommends 
that it be officially published as the Constitution Project 
of the Republic and submitted by referendum to the 
universal, free and secret vote of citizens, together with 
the Constitutional Transit Bill; that the referendum be 
organized so that all citizens with the right to vote have 
the opportunity to vote in it, for which polling places must 
be established with reference not only to domicile, but 
also to where the voters are located . . . so that the 
Constitution can be proclaimed solemnly on February 24, 
the eighty-first anniversary of the start of the 
revolutionary war for national independence organized by 
José Martí, whose desire that the First Law of the 
Republic is the cult of Cubans to the full dignity of man, 
presides over our Constitution, as a norm of our socialist 
society and principle always present in the whole 
development of our Revolution.87 
 
But this engagement was not to be undertaken without 
boundaries on discourse. Rather popular participation was meant 
to serve as a further means through which the vanguard 
revolutionary party could continue its project of socializing the 
masses to the revolutionary order. Fidel Castro made that quite 
clear in his address to the Congress: 
 
We are sure that whatever may be missing so that the 
Congress has the highest quality, so that the event has the 
greatest significance, will be carried out. Because this is 
precisely the First Congress, it is faced with countless 
issues of the greatest interest. And, in reality, great and 
important decisions, which will greatly influence the 
 
87 I Congresso Del Pcc: Tesis Y Resoluciones Sobra La Constitucíon Y Ley De Tránsito 
Constitucional, GRANMA (Dec. 26, 1975), at 5. 
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future life of the country, must be taken by that Congress. 
Currently, we are in the midst of discussing the 
Constitution of the Republic with all the people. The 
Constitution of the Republic took us almost 40 hours of 
analysis and discussion in the Preparatory Commission. 
Now all the people are discussing it. Then we will have to 
analyze it again, taking into account the opinions and the 
judgments that have been expressed. And we see with 
what interest the people have taken the discussion of the 
Constitution. * * * When the revolutionary processes are 
institutionalized and consolidated through truly adequate 
institutions - as was the case with the Bolshevik 
Revolution, which is now more than 50 years old, which 
is progressing uninterruptedly, and we know that it will 
continue to advance - we see what great stability it gives 
these people, What great stability do these nations and 
these human collectivities have when they organize 
themselves well, when they become well 
institutionalized, when they have the right organisms to 
move forward?88  
 
 
88 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the Party 




(“Estamos seguros de que lo que falta para que el Congreso tenga la mayor 
calidad, que el evento tenga la mayor significación, será cumplido. Por ser este 
precisamente el Primer Congreso, comprende un sinnúmero de asuntos del mayor 
interés. Y, en realidad, grandes e importantes decisiones, que influirán 
enormemente en la vida futura del país, se han de tomar en ese Congreso. Por lo 
pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el pueblo la Constitución de la República. 
La Constitución de la República nos llevó casi 40 horas de análisis y de discusión 
en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está discutiendo todo el pueblo. Después 
tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando en cuenta las opiniones y los 
criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés el pueblo ha tomado la 
discusión de la Constitución. * * * Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se 
institucionalizan y se consolidan através de instituciones realmente adecuadas —
como ocurrió con la Revolución Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que 
avanza ininterrumpidamente, y sabemos que seguirá avanzando—, vemos qué 
gran estabilidad le da a esos pueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y 
esas colectividades humanas cuando se organizan bien, cuando se 
institucionalizan bien, cuando tienen los organismos adecuados para marchar 
adelante.”).  
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And that that popular engagement was to be undertaken and 
narrowed through the lens of revolutionary representation. It was 
clear that the idea ideologically was that the masses would be 
represented best by those among them with the greatest credentials 
as PCC adherents and most attached to the PCC's line developed 
especially for the purpose of conceiving and articulating a 
constitution.  
 
Our people know who is part of the Party, know that these 
militantes [cadres] were selected in the work centers with 
the active participation of the masses; [our people] know 
that the best workers work in the Party, knows that the 
best citizens are in the Party, and knows that for the 
Congress the Communists chose among the best 
Communists to draw the line of the Party. (Applause) And 
that is why our people feel represented in the Party. But 
also, the most important principles were discussed with 
all the people. The people participated in the elaboration 
of these principles and in the elaboration of the politics of 
the future years. And that is why our people know that the 
principles and agreements of the Congress are their 
principles and are their agreements! (APPLAUSE). If 
there, in the "Karl Marx", the Congress of the Party meets, 
here in the Plaza of the Revolution the People's Congress 
meets to express its support for the agreements of the 
Congress (applause). But if we vote there, we must vote 
here too (applause). If there we discuss and approve all 
theses, here, in representation of all the people, we must 
also vote, and ask our people if they support or do not 
support the agreements of the Congress (applause and 
shouts of: "Yes!").89 
 
89 “Nuestro pueblo sabe quiénes integran el Partido, sabe que esos militantes 
fueron seleccionados en los centros de trabajo con la activa participación de las 
masas; sabe que en el Partido militan los mejores obreros, sabe que en el Partido 
militan los mejores ciudadanos, y sabe que para el Congreso los comunistas 
eligieron entre los mejores comunistas para trazar la línea del Partido 
(APLAUSOS). Y por eso, nuestro pueblo se siente representado en el Partido. Pero 
además, las tesis más importantes fueron discutidas con todo el pueblo. El pueblo 
participó en la elaboración de esas tesis y en la elaboración de la política de los 
años futuros. ¡Y por eso sabe que las tesis y los acuerdos del Congreso son sus tesis 
y son sus acuerdos! (APLAUSOS). Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso 
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The conflations so densely intermeshed in the quoted language 
above becomes the operative model of popular participation, and 
also established a baseline that itself will prove a challenge to a 
Leninist organizational structure increasingly desiring to 
streamline its governance organs—including organs for popular 
affirmation. Yet the keys to overcoming that contradiction are 
already present here—the identity between the PCC and the 
leading forces of the nation, the identity between Party cadres and 
the most suitable representatives of the masses, the dual role of the 
PCC as both the vanguard party whose leadership is central to 
government and as the true representation (incarnation) of the 
people and the popular will essential for the legitimization of the 
actions undertaken by the vanguard, and the importance of 
popular consultation of the work product of the Party and its 
organs by the people whose interventions are then considered in 
finalizing actions by Party and State. But at the same time there is 
at least one last look back to earlier forms of mass expression—of 
the authority of gatherings of the masses at the instance of and 
under the guidance of the PCC, whose affirmation of their 
representatives’ action "performs" sovereign approval. These are 
the patterns that ought to be keep in mind as we move from the 
development of these reflexes in the practice of Cuban Leninism, 
and the process through which, after 2011, the economic and 
political model of the state and party are reconceptualized, an 
economic plan for the nation is developed, a program of reform and 
opening up as the basic line of the PCC is developed, and the 
national constitution is reformed.90  
 
 
del Partido, aquí en la Plaza dela Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para 
expresar su apoyo a los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos, 
aquí debemos votar también (APLAUSOS). Si allí discutimos y aprobamos todas 
las tesis, aquí, en representación de todo el pueblo, debemos también votar, y 
preguntarle a nuestro pueblo si apoya o no apoya los acuerdos del Congreso 
(APLAUSOS Y EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡Sí!"). Id. 
90 See generally, JORGE DOMINGUEZ, OMAR EVERLENY PÉREZ VILLANUEVA, EDS., THE 
CUBAN ECONOMY IN A NEW ERA: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE TOWARD DURABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for 
Latin American Studies and Harvard University Press, 2017) (discussing how the 
economic model has not gone uncontested). 
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iii. Caveats.  
Again, a number of caveats are in order at this point. The first 
is that the transposition of the (convenient) Soviet model also 
managed to transpose its weaknesses. These included the cult of 
personality Stalinism that ultimately contributed to the collapse of 
Soviet versions of Leninism,91 and the construction of a rules-bound 
nomenklatura that would effectively seek to smother democratic 
engagement and the role of the masses and mass organizations in 
their collective exercise of discretionary political power.92 Second, 
the period from 1976 and the conclusion of the 1st PCC Congress 
increasingly evidence the growing gap between theory (such as it 
might be developed) and the realities of Cuban government, 
usually characterized as reinventions or reactions to stress.93 The 
resulting evisceration of Leninist theory reduced its utility to post 
facto rationalization to cover the pragmatic decision making that 
passed for PCC leadership from 1976.94 Third, evisceration was also 
noticeable in the way in which the institutionalization of “popular 
power” within the Asamblea Nacional produced a greater distance 
between the masses, and mass organizations, and the leadership of 
the PCC. Even by the standards of classical Leninist theory, the 
resulting Stalinization of the role of masses made affirmation not 
 
91 See, e.g., Graeme Gill, The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of 
Leadership in the Soviet Union, 10 BRITISH J. OF POL. SCIENCE 167, 167-186 (1980). See 
Note, supra note 9. See also A.V. Pyzhikov, A. V., The cult of personality during the 
Khrushchev Thaw. 50(3) RUSSIA STUD. IN HISTORY 11, 11–27 (2012). See, e.g., D. LEESE, 
MAO CULT: RHETORIC AND RITUAL IN CHINA’S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) (discussing the Chinese version of personality 
cults). 
92 See generally, John Lowenhardt, Nomenklatura and the Soviet Constitution, 10 REV. 
SOCIALIST L. 35 (1984); Bohdan Harasymiw, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist 
Party's Leadership Recruitment System, 2 CANADIAN J. OF POL. SCIENCE, 493–512 
(1969); John P. Burns, China's Nomenklatura System, 36 PROBS. COMMUNISM 36 (1987) 
(discussing the Chinese nomenklatura system). 
93 See generally, MAX AZICRI, CUBA TODAY AND TOMORROW: REINVENTING SOCIALISM 
246-249 (2004); PHILIP BRENNER, MARGUERITE ROSE JIMÉNEZ, JOHN M. KIRK, WILLIAM 
M. LEOGRANDE (EDS.), A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: REINVENTING THE 
REVOLUTION 25-104 (Rwoman and Littlefield, 2008); ARIANA HERNANDEZ-REGUANT 
(ED.), CUBA IN THE SPECIAL PERIOD: CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 1990S (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009). 
94 See, e.g., Paul C. Sondrol, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of 
Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner, 23(3) J. OF LATIN AM. STUDIES 599-620 (1991); Bert 
Hoffmann, Transitions from Charismatic Rule: Theories of Leadership Change and 
Cuba's Post-Fidel Succession, GIGA Working Paper No. 56 (Aug. 1, 2007). 
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merely vestigial after 1962, but also irrelevant—until it was 
resurrected after 2011.95 Third, even with the construction of the 
Asamblea nacional mechanism, the problem of mass representation 
remained unresolved in theory and practice. Jorge Dominguez has 
suggested the ways in which claims of voting itself have proven 
either that it retains a fidelity to bourgeoisie roots (voting for people 
rather than affirming qualified representative choices of the 
vanguard)or that the affirmation/engagement role of the Asamblea 
remains under developed.96 The result was either systemic 
corruption or/and functional delegitimization.  
 
 
D. A Pure Theory of Elections within a Caribbean Leninist 
State. 
 
Cuba's first post 1959 revolution constitutional plebiscite was 
held as part of the organization of the Cuban Communist Party and 
the institutionalization of its structures. It marked one of the 
significant products of the PCC's 1st Congress.97 It was embedded 
within a broader project of elaborating the core principles of what 
would become Cuba's Caribbean Marxism, with respect to what 
would emerge as the first conceptualization of Cuba's economic 
and political model. This formalization of the PCC's "Basic Line"98 
and the conceptual expression of the principles of political and 
economic organization were expressed in the many documents and 
resolution produced under the guidance of the Central Committee 
 
95 For a discussion of the use of mass organizations in Cuba after 1959, see, e.g., 
Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, 44(2) LATIN AM. POL. AND SOC. 67 (2008). 
96 Jorge I. Dominguez, Chair of Harvard Academy for International and Area 
Studies, Address to the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of the 
Cuban Economy: The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba’s 
Council of State in a Comparative Context (July 25-27, 2019). 
97 Congreso PCC, Llamamiento al 1er Congreso PCC, Centro de Información para la 
Prensa (1975). 
98 On the role and shaping of a communist party “basic line” see, e.g., John Wilson 
Lewis, The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the 
People's Commune, 3 ASIAN SURVEY 457-464 (1963); Larry Catá Backer, supra note 
28. 
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of the PCC and its First Secretary, and approved at the 1st PCC 
Congress.99 
 
To those ends, of course, the 1st PCC Congress and its work 
product constituted the first major coordinated effort to solidify the 
ideological foundations of the Cuban political-economic model and 
on that foundation to build the institutional structures necessary for 
its application to the nation.100 That foundation looked to 
institutionalize the role of the Communist Party in its overarching 
role as a vanguard with the primary objective of ensuring stability 
and conformity with its ideological line in the operation of the state. 
“When the revolutionary processes are institutionalized and are 
consolidated through institutions that are really adequate—as 
occurred with the Bolshevik Revolution, now more than 50 years 
old, that advances in an uninterrupted way, and that we know will 
continue advancing—one sees the sort of profound stability these 
institutions provide to those peoples, one sees the sort of great 
stability that these nations and human collectives have, when they 
are well organized, when they are well institutionalized, and when 
they have the appropriate organs to move forward.”101 
 
99Among the documents that remain available on the PCC website are those that 
touch on the issues of formal PCC organization, and the expectations of PCC 
cadres, on the organs of popular power, on the establishment of mechanisms for a 
centrally planned economy, on the role of the Party-State in science, arts and 
culture, on the guiding role of the PCC and its work of socializing the masses, and 
on the relationship between the Party-State and religious establishments. See e.g., 
Sobre la Plataforma Programática.; Sobre los Estatutos del Partido.; Sobre la Vida Interna 
del Partido.; Sobre la política de formación, selección, ubicación, promoción y superación 
de los cuadros.; Sobre las directivas para el desarrollo económico y social en el quinquenio 
1976-1980.; Sobre la Constitución y Ley de tránsito constitucional. Sobre los Organos del 
Poder Popular.; Sobre la División Político-administrativa.; Sobre las directivas para el 
desarrollo económico y social en el quinquenio 1976-1980.; Sobre el Cronograma de 
aplicación de la división político-administrativa, los órganos del Poder Popular y el Sistema 
de Dirección de la economía.; Sobre Política Internacional.; Sobre los Estudios del 
marxismo-leninismo en nuestro país.; Sobre los Medios de difusión masiva.; Sobre Política 
educacional.; Sobre Política Científica Nacional.; Sobre la Cultura artística y literaria.; 
Sobre la Cuestión agraria y las relaciones con el campesinado.; Sobre la Política en relación 
con la religión, la iglesia y los creyentes.; Sobre el pleno ejercicio de la igualdad de la mujer.; 
Sobre la formación de la niñez y la juventud.; Sobre las apelaciones.; Sobre el XI Festival 
Mundial de la Juventud y los Estudiantes.; Resolución Especial. 
100 See id. 
101 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the Party 
of Leaders of Mass Organizations (May 29, 1975), (available at: 
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/PCC/1congreso/DISCURSO-DE-FIDEL-EN-
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Thus, that solidification has had staying power; despite many 
challenges and crisis, the vanguard party has remained loyal to 
the core premises of what in retrospect were the foundations of 
Cuba's Caribbean Marxism.102 These continue to inform the 
operation and conceptual universe of its leaders to this day.103 That 
institutionalization included among its core elements a state 
constitution, the reorganization of territorial divisions, the 
establishment of a national assembly, and the reorganization of the 
administrative organs of the state. “In these last few months, the 
Revolution has been expending a considerable effort to implement 
the accords adopted by the [First PCC] Congress: the Constitution, 
the establishment of the [National Assembly of] Popular Power, the 
new Political-Administrative division, the restructuring of the 
central organs of the state, the progressive embedding of a system 
of management for the economy, and countless more tasks of 
partisan and state order.”104  
 
Caribbean Marxism, however, was never intended as mere 
theory. Rather, its object was to inform the political and economic 
project of the PCC to be implemented through administrate 
institutions designed and operated to that end. This, as a first task, 




(“Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se institucionalizan y se consolidan através 
de instituciones realmente adecuadas—como ocurrió con la Revolución 
Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que avanza ininterrumpidamente, y 
sabemos que seguirá avanzando—vemos qué gran estabilidad le da a esos 
pueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y esas colectividades humanas 
cuando se organizan bien, cuando se institucionalizan bien, cuando tienen los 
organismos adecuados para marchar adelante.”). 
102 BACKER, supra note 3 at 27-35. 
103 Jorge I. Dominguez, CUBAN COMMUNISM 533-540 (Irving Louis Horowitz & 
Jaime Suchlicki, eds., 10th ed. 2001); see generally BACKER, supra note 3. 
104 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered to the City 
of Havana (Sept. 28, 1976), (available at: 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f280976e.html) (“La 
Revolución viene realizando en estos últimos meses un considerable esfuerzo en 
la aplicación de los acuerdos del Congreso: la Constitución, el establecimiento de 
los Poderes Populares, la nueva División Político-Administrativa, la 
reestructuración de los organismos centrales del Estado, la implantación 
progresiva de un sistema de dirección de la economía, e incontables tareas más de 
orden partidario y estatal.“). 
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economic and political model embraced in the 1st PCC Congress 
required translation into an institutionalized political apparatus. 
That, in turn, required the institutionalization of a mass 
organization for the expression of popular power. That produced 
the organization of the National Assembly of Popular Power, 
whose work began on 2 December 1976.105 
 
In this transcendental and historical act, of which we are 
all living witnesses, the provisional period of the 
Revolutionary Government ceases and our definitive 
institutional forms are adopted by our socialist State. The 
National Assembly is constituted as the supreme organ of 
the State and assumes the functions assigned to it by the 
Constitution. It was a duty and it is at the same time a 
great triumph of our generation to reach this goal. * * * 
These representatives of the people receive no 
remuneration for their status as deputies. Nor do they 
exercise office without the control of their fellow citizens. 
Their representation is revocable at any time by the same 
that elected them. None will be above the law, nor the rest 
of his countrymen. Their positions do not entail privileges 
but duties and responsibilities. In our system, too, the 
government and the administration of justice depend 
directly on the National Assembly. There is division of 
functions, but there is no division of powers. Power is one, 
that of the working people, exercised through the National 
Assembly and the State agencies that depend on it.106 
 
105 I Legislatura 1976–1981, PARLAMENTO CUBANO (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.parlamentocubano.gob.cu/index.php/i-legislatura-1976-1981/ (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2019). 
106 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the 
National Assembly of Popular Power (Dec. 2, 1976), (available at: 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html) (“En este 
acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el 
período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado 
socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye 
en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución. 
Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta 
meta. * * * Estos representantes del pueblo no reciben remuneración alguna por su 
condición de diputados. Tampoco ejercen el cargo sin el control de sus 
conciudadanos. Su representación es revocable en cualquier instante por los 
mismos que los eligieron. Ninguno estará por encima de la ley, ni del resto de sus 
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A blueprint was also required for the administrative structure 
through which the economic and political model could be 
implemented through state organs. These administrative organs 
would institutionalize administrative authority through which the 
PCC would operate—not as a vanguard, but as a state organ 
asserting the administrative power of government both internally 
and externally. These were to be confirmed by the new 
revolutionary constitution. 
 
These organs were not meant merely to implement Marxist 
Leninist ideology, but to preserve it as well. Fidel Castro in 1976 
was at some pains to point out the importance of the relation 
between ideology, the state organs, and the integrity of the 
vanguard Communist Party by contrasting Cuba and the Soviet 
Union to China. China ceased to be a Leninist and Marxist state 
when it chose to abandon its core ideology, when it started to 
abandon class struggle and the privileging of workers, peasants 
and their allies. 
 
That the most absurd things can happen even in the bosom 
of the socialist family and in countries that started that 
glorious and revolutionary path, if the principles are 
neglected, if the concepts are lost, if men become gods, if 
internationalism is abandons, it's the recent history of 
China. * * * All this can happen when a corrupted and 
deified clique can take over the Party, destroy, humiliate 
and crush the best militants and impose its will on the 
entire nation, supported by the strength and prestige that 
emanates from a profound social revolution. I have 
always believed that the founders of a revolutionary 
socialist process acquire before their fellow citizens such 
authority and ancestry, such and such powerful means of 
power that the unrestricted use of that authority, that 
 
compatriotas. Sus cargos no entrañan privilegios sino deberes y 
responsabilidades. También en nuestro sistema el gobierno y la administración de 
justicia dependen directamente de la Asamblea Nacional. Hay división de 
funciones, pero no hay división de poderes. El poder es uno, el del pueblo 
trabajador, que se ejerce a través de la Asamblea Nacional y de los organismos del 
Estado que de ella dependen.”). 
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prestige and those means can lead to serious errors and 
incredible abuses of power. I think for that reason and I 
have always thought that whatever the individual merits 
of any man, every manifestation of personality cult must 
be radically avoided; that any man, no matter what 
aptitudes can be attributed to him, will never be superior 
to collective capacity, than collegiate leadership, 
unrestricted respect for the practice of criticism and self-
criticism, socialist legality, democracy and partisan and 
state discipline and the inviolability of the norms and the 
basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism and socialism are the 
only values on which a true revolutionary leadership can 
be sustained.107 
 
Thus, ideology provides the boundary between a revolutionary 
democratic state under the direction of a vanguard party, and a 
vanguard party that it has become a reactionary force. But that 
ideology can only be protected by the masses themselves—that is, 
the revolutionary masses to which popular authority could be 
vested—in a state of class struggle that would include only 
workers, students, peasants and their allies. They serve as the 
critical authenticating and protective force that preserves the 
Leninist and Marxist principles of the state even against its own 
 
107 “De que las cosas más absurdas pueden ocurrir aún en el seno de la familia 
socialista y en países que iniciaron ese glorioso y revolucionario camino, si los 
principios se descuidan, si los conceptos se pierden, si los hombres se hacen dioses, 
si el internacionalismo se abandona, es la historia reciente de China. * * * Todo eso 
puede ocurrir cuando una camarilla corrompida y endiosada puede hacerse dueña 
del Partido, destruir, humillar y aplastar a los mejores militantes e imponer su 
voluntad a toda la nación, apoyada en la fuerza y el prestigio que emana de una 
profunda revolución social. Siempre he creído que los fundadores de un proceso 
revolucionario socialista adquieren ante sus conciudadanos tal autoridad y 
ascendencia, tales y tan poderosos medios de poder, que el uso irrestricto de esa 
autoridad, ese prestigio y esos medios puede llevar a graves errores e increíbles 
abusos de poder. Pienso por ello y he pensado siempre, que cualesquiera que sean 
los méritos individuales de cualquier hombre, toda manifestación de culto a la 
personalidad debe ser radicalmente evitada; que cualquier hombre, no importa 
qué aptitudes se le puedan atribuir, nunca será superior a la capacidad colectiva, 
que la dirección colegiada, el respeto irrestricto a la práctica de la crítica y la 
autocrítica, la legalidad socialista, la democracia y disciplina partidista y estatal y 
la inviolabilidad de las normas y las ideas básicas del marxismo-leninismo y el 
socialismo son los únicos valores sobre los cuales puede sostenerse una verdadera 
dirección revolucionaria.” Id. 
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organs. Consequently, the ideology, and the institutionalization of 
state and Party organs was not enough to conform to the core 
ideological requisite of mass solidarity. Though these organs of 
popular power that implemented the conceptualization of the 
Cuban economic and political model were developed under the 
leadership of and with the guidance of the PCC, it was also thought 
necessary to invoke a mechanism for the concrete expression of 
popular participation and approval. 
 
That institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was to be 
undertaken in two ways. The first was through an exercise of popular 
consultation. That in turn served the purposes of obtaining 
feedback, but also as a mechanism for identifying popular 
sentiment and to socialize the masses as to the appropriate way to 
approach the political project undertaken through the leadership of 
the PCC. “For now, we are already discussing the Constitution of 
the Republic with all the people. The Constitution of the Republic 
took us almost 40 hours of analysis and discussion in the 
Preparatory Commission. Now the whole town is discussing it. 
Then we will have to analyze it again, taking into account the 
opinions and criteria that have been expressed. And we see with 
what interest the people have taken the discussion of the 
Constitution.”108 To that end, the state organized a comprehensive 
series of formalized discussion session where popular opinion was 
identified, gathered, and passed on in summary form.109 And, in 
that respect the local mass organizations served a useful purpose to 
both organize mass engagement, and to discipline it.110 
 
108 Castro Ruz, supra note 101 ("Por lo pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el 
pueblo la Constitución de la República. La Constitución de la República nos llevó 
casi 40 horas de análisis y de discusión en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está 
discutiendo todo el pueblo. Después tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando 
en cuenta las opiniones y los criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés 
el pueblo ha tomado la discusión de la Constitución."). 
109 1 JAN SUTER & DIETER NOHLEN, ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAS 197 (Dieter Nohlen 
ed., 2005). 
110 Castro Ruz, supra note 104 (“Y, efectivamente, además de las tareas habituales, 
los Comités de Defensa han desarrollado un gran esfuerzo en apoyo de todas las 
actividades que se llevan a cabo en cumplimiento de los acuerdos del Primer 
Congreso. Fue necesario un arduo trabajo para organizar el referéndum en que se 
proclamó la Constitución Socialista de nuestro país; ha sido necesario también un 
ingente esfuerzo en todas las tareas relacionadas con la nueva División Político-
Administrativa y la constitución de los Poderes Populares; todo el trabajo 
relacionado con los carnés de identidad, los registros de electores y la organización 
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The second form of institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was 
to be undertaken by signs of mass approval of the final product 
developed from consultation and the work undertaken under the 
leadership of the PCC. This was to take two distinct but related 
forms, each evidencing the unique re-characterization of the 
devices in socialist terms. Indeed, at this initial phase of socialist 
mass participation (still too early to call it theorized socialist 
democracy), it was necessary to develop the character and nature 
of popular (mass) participation. The first modality for the expression of 
mass solidarity was through acclamation, and the expression of the 
unity of the people with the Party at mass events guided by PCC 
leadership. "But, in addition, this Congress has reflected the 
extraordinary unity of our people and our Party, and it has been a 
profoundly just and profoundly human Congress."111 This 
acclamation device was to be manifested at mass events. The Cuban 
state apparatus was careful to record this manifestation. Again, a 
reminder of the critical portion of the address quoted at greater 
length above: “If there was in the "Karl Marx" the Congress of the 
Party met, here in the Plaza de la Revolución the People's Congress 
meets to express its support for the agreements of the Congress 
(applause). But if we vote there, we must vote here too 
(applause).”112 
 
The second modality of the expression of mass solidarity was through 
the mechanism of voting. That required resort to the traditional device 
of elections, in the case of constitutional reform through the 
organization of a plebiscite in which the masses, under the 
leadership of the PCC, would express their approval of the work of 
 
del proceso; el trabajo relacionado con la movilización de masas, las asambleas 
diferentes que hay que llevar a cabo. ¡Ahí han estado presentes los Comités de 
Defensa de la Revolución!”). 
111 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at the First 
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (Dec. 22, 1975), 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1975/esp/c221275e.html (Pero, 
además, este Congreso ha reflejado la extraordinaria unidad de nuestro pueblo y 
de nuestro Partido. Y ha sido un Congreso profundamente justo y profundamente 
humano."). 
112 Id. (“Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso del Partido, aquí en la 
Plaza de la Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para expresar su apoyo a 
los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos, aquí debemos votar 
también (APLAUSOS).”). 
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the PCC and its organs evidenced in the Constitutional draft 
(ostensibly amended in light of popular commentary). The 
referendum was held on 15 February 1976 and served as the first 
time since before 1959 that the Cuban people were permitted to 
participate in a nationwide vote. It was overwhelmingly 
approved.113 This is not meant to be the same as elections in liberal 
democratic states, but to reflect the assent of the people to the 
product of the process in which they had a direct involvement. At 
the same time, it was said to close the transitional period, and to 
that extent, might have been thought to be consigned to that 
familiar dustbin of history. “Así dicho se obvia que la Constitución 
de 1976 significó el cierre del Período de Provisionalidad, 
interregno útil a la progresiva institucionalización del naciente 
Estado revolucionario, y que por lo tanto, algunas de las 
prescripciones constitucionales ya tenían precedente en leyes y 
prácticas políticas anterior114  
 
E. The Template for Constitutional Plebiscite 
 
 As is now clearer, by 1975, the Cuban revolutionary leading 
group was faced with a conundrum for the establishment of its 
 
113 As noted above in the data on the voting for the 1976 Cuba Constitution 
referendum. Kuba, 15. Februar 1976: Verfassung, DATABASE AND SEARCH 
ENGINE FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=cu011976. 
114 (Teodoro) Yan Guzman Hernández, Los Mecanismos de Democracia Directa en 
Cuba: Diseño Normativo y Práctica, 25 PERFILES LATINOAMERICANOS, 103, 103-
127 (2017) (“El tránsito de la LF1959 a la Constitución de 1976 trajo consigo la única 
consulta popular en las urnas de la historia constitucional de Cuba; la decisión fue 
adoptada por el Consejo de Ministros y el Buró Político del Partido Comunista. 
Esa consulta fue calificada como referendo (Vega, 1988: p. 119; Azcuy, 2004: p. 83, 
Guanche, 2011: p. 42), y además de que se oficializó con esa denominación (Ley 
No 1229/1975), justo recayó sobre la Constitución vigente para su aprobación. 
Previamente se había sometido a debate popular el anteproyecto, por lo que el 
pueblo podía modificar su contenido; pero la mayoría de esos cambios fueron 
poco sustanciales, basta comparar el anteproyecto con la Constitución aprobada. * 
* * Algunos consideran a esta consulta popular de aprobación de la Constitución 
cubana en 1975 como un plebiscito vinculante (Altman, 2005: p. 218; Hevia, 2010: 
p. 177), otros han minimizado la trascendencia del proceso de elaboración de la 
Constitución de 1976, que involucró una participación directa sui generis (el 
debate popular) con un MDD, arguyendo que este (el proceso en su totalidad) 
ocurrió en un ambiente autoritario (Vergottini, 2009: p. 146), o con falta de 
libertades públicas (Asensi, 1996: p. 63).”). 
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legitimacy. On the one hand, the revolutionary government was by 
1975 firmly Marxist Leninist in a classically European sense. It had 
already made clear its rejection of the Chinese path toward Leninist 
state organization,115 and it rejected any tilt of Marxist economics 
grounded in state directed markets theory.116 On the other hand, its 
form embraced the original contradiction of Marxist-Leninist 
states—the centrality of class struggle and the primacy of worker-
peasant solidarity given voice through the vanguard—required a 
more direct incorporation of popular participation directly in the 
constitution of the state and administrative apparatus, as well as in 
the formulation of the basic conceptualization of the economic and 
political model. Yet this engagement with the masses were to be 
undertaken even as a primary responsibility of the Leninist 
vanguard was to guide the masses toward a better understanding 
of its role within a Marxist state.  
 
For the Cuban state leaders, the solution appeared in two 
tracks. On the one hand, ‘the masses were to be engaged in the 
process of formulating theory and institutional charters.’ On the 
other they were to ‘affirm or assent to the adoption of those 
documents—at the instance of the vanguard—through the 
traditional mechanics of voting.’ At the same time, engagement was 
understood to serve as a means of socializing the masses and 
leading them to a proper understanding of the tasks and of the 
necessary content of theory and the necessary character of the 
institutions of state and Party. Likewise, affirmation acts were not 
to be understood as liberal democratic elections or voting. 
Acclamation could be manifested in mass assemblies; and it could 
also be managed through referendum.  
 
 
115 See Yinghong Cheng, Sino-Cuban Relations During the Early Years of the Castro 
Regime, 1959–1966, 9 J. OF COLD WAR STUD. 78, 78-114 (2007); William R. Garner, 
The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America, 10 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. 244, 244 
(1968).  
116 These ideas were reaffirmed in the 4th PCC Congress. See, e.g., Javier Corrales, 
The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989–
2002, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 35, 35-65 (2004) in DEBATING CUBAN EXCEPTIONALISM. 
STUDIES OF THE AMERICAS 61, 61-88 (Bert Hoffmann & Laurence Whitehead eds., 
2007; Bert Hoffman, Transformation and Continuity in Cuba, 33 REV. OF RADICAL POL. 
ECON. 1, 1-20 (2001)). See, e.g., Al Campbell, Planning in Cuba Today, 34 INT’L J. OF 
POL. ECON. 65, 65-83 (2014) (for a discussion of the embrace of central planning and 
the rejection of markets from the 1970s). 
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The process of constitutionalizing the state around the 
paramount political leadership of the Cuban Communist Party 
(PCC) undertaken during the course of the 1st POC Congress, the 
process of managing popular engagement, of responding to that 
engagement with changes to draft documents, and thereafter of 
securing mass approval, set the template for each of these action in 
the future. For us—as we undertake the close study of the process 
of securing constitutional revision—first through the leading 
elements of the PCC, then through drafting committee and POC 
Congress, and then through the organization of mass power, to 
popular consultation and thereafter to be affirmed through a 
national plebiscite, the actions of state and party in 1975 provide 
both a baseline and the conceptual starting point for the eventual 
development of Cuban theories of Socialist Democracy.117 
  
At the same time, it is important to distinguish 
constitutionalizing action separated by almost a generation, and 
made more remote by the profound changed in the world as well 
as in Cuba since the adoption of the 1976 Constitution and the 
organization of the institutional structures of the PCC. For one 
thing, that branch of Soviet Marxist Leninism has withered on the 
vine.118 Its last real theorist, however, was Fidel Castro himself.119 
Yet Cuba's own engagement with Leninism as the remnant of 
Soviet ideology has been profoundly challenged both by regional 
changes and by the vigorous development of 21st century Chinese 
Marxist Leninism. China provides both support and inspiration, 
but at the same time a challenge to Cuban ideology. That challenge 
intensifies to the extent to which Cuba remains committed to classic 
class struggle, continues to reject the market as inherently a device 
of capitalist imperialism, and continues to define itself against the 
United States (as the ultimate 'other'). At the same time, China's 
influence has grown as its interest in Cuba has deepened and as its 
international importance has expanded. Moreover, by 2018, the 
 
117 See William M. Leogrande, The Communist Party of Cuba Since the First Congress, 
12 J. OF LATIN AM. STUD. 397, 397-419 (1980); Wiliam M. Leogrande, Party 
Development in Revolutionary Cuba, 21 J. OF INTER-AM. STUD. AND WORLD AFF. 457, 
457-480 (1979) (on the process of producing the work of the 1st PCC Congress and 
the role of the various stakeholders in Cuba). 
118 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (recounting 
this most famously from a Western perspective). 
119 BACKER, supra note 3.  
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PCC itself had already developed quite distinct markers of 
participation that went well beyond the highly controlled 
engagement that was at the center of mass participation in 1975.  
 
Thus, it is important to start with 1975 as the baseline for 
methodologies, and perhaps theories of mass participation. At the 
same time, those baseline templates were themselves transformed 
starting with the movement, after Raúl Castro's assumption of apex 
authority within the FAR and the PCC, and the development of 
more open textured (by Cuban standards) methods for popular 
engagement in what became the PCC's Lineamientos, and 
thereafter its reconceptualization of the political and economic 
model, and now the 2019 Constitution. What are the central 
elements of that template? The central elements of this template 
begin when Cuba’s PCC adopted something that to American eyes 
appears to look suspiciously like a corporate governance model, 
one grounded in the fundamental principle that a core leadership 
is vested with the authority to manage the affairs of state solely in 
the interests of the collective (shareholders) with the day to day 
work of administration undertaken by its officers (or officials).120 
That translates in Leninist terms to the following—all political 
change must originate in the PCC. At the same time the PCC is 
constrained by its own line to the sorts of political projects it might 
initiate, as well as with respect to its contents.  
 
Legitimacy requires affirmation by the masses, the way the key 
board proposals require shareholder approval.121 The object of this 
 
120 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate 
Governance, 48 THE BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993) (on this standard governance model of 
corporations). See Harold Seidman, The Theory of the Autonomous Government 
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 12 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 89 (1952) (on the theorization 
of political power as a corporation, and the American model of domestic 
governance). 
121 SCOTT BOWMAN, MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: 
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY (2010) (analyzing this and other analogies in detail). 
Here, one makes a connection not just between models of liberal democratic 
politics but also with its principles of corporate governance. See, e.g., John Pound, 
The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 8 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1003 (1993). But the model does not run solely from the political to the 
corporate—it can run the other way as well—so as corporate governance is 
sometimes said to embrace the ideologies of the liberal democracies (see Lisa M. 
Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259 (2009) (for an example 
with respect to shareholder democracy principles), states may also adopt 
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approval under the guidance of the PCC, is in part to legitimate the 
PCC's work, but also to educate the masses and move the PCC's 
project forward of socializing the masses into appropriate class 
consciousness and thus of advancing their loyalty to the revolution 
and its principles. To that extent, and again borrowing an analogy 
from American corporate practice—engagement was to be 
structured and managed in ways that contemporary Americans 
would recognize as corporate or small town "town hall 
meetings".122 One of us have referred to this as Populist 
Technocracy and Engagement.123 In this context, Western 
references to the USSR incorporated,124 or China, Inc.,125 assume a 
constitutional or at least a normatively constitutive dimension. 
 
The Constitution follows the development of political principle 
and remains subordinate to those principles. In this sense, the 
constitution memorializes the normative structures the control of 
which is delegated to the PCC and the content of which is subject 
to its own development of Marxism and Leninism in context.126 As 
such, constitutional reform is both a consequential event (and in 
this sense a technical rather than a normative project) and 
constrained by core premises and principles which may not be 
 
corporate governance principles in their operations (through delegations of broad 
authority to leadership collectives onto which substantial discretionary power is 
vested). 
122 See Gary Tomlinson, Building a Culture of High Employee Engagement, 3 STRATEGIC 
HUMAN RESOURCES REV. 25 (2010) (on the impact of town hall meetings on 
employee morale). See also Interview by Jim Blasingame with Harold Lacy (Jan. 11, 
1999), https://www.smallbusinessadvocate.com/small-business-
interviews/harold-lacy-2; William Hubbartt, "Town Hall" Meetings Good For 
Employee Morale, THE SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCATE (Apr. 15, 2003), 
https://www.smallbusinessadvocate.com/small-business-articles/town-hall-
meetings-good-for-employee-morale-2. 
123 Larry Catá Backer, On the Practice of Town Hall Meetings in Shared Governance—
Populist Technocracy and Engagement at Penn State, MONITORING UNIVERSITY 
GOVERNANCE (June 17, 2015), https://lcbpsusenate.blogspot.com/2015/06/on-
practice-of-town-hall-meetings-in.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). 
124 See, e.g., T. H. Rigby, Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura 
System, 40 J. OF SOVIET STUD. 
523, 523-537 (1988).  
125 See, e.g., TED FISHMAN, CHINA, INC.: HOW THE RISE OF THE NEXT SUPERPOWER 
CHALLENGES AMERICA AND THE WORLD (Scribner, 2006). 
126 See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional 
Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 BOS. U. 
INT'L L. J. 331, 331-408 (2012) (in the Chinese context). 
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challenged through the process of constitutional reform. The basic 
relationship between constitutional reform and the PCC political 
line, then constrains and shapes the nature of popular engagement 
(by defining what may or may not be suggested) and by then 
providing the mechanisms for weighing the value of such 
contributions. It is in that sense that any engagement in which 
suggestions for the abandonment of central planning (for example) 
would just not register on those charged with receiving popular 
suggestions.  
 
Still, nothing is sacred about the forms of popular affirmation. 
Mass events are as legitimate as traditional voting. Moreover, mass 
engagement must be organized through the institutions of mass 
revolutionary discipline—for example the committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution, who themselves are committed to 
moving forward the PCC line against "reactionary" and dissident 
elements. It is in that sense that one could conceive of the process 
as entirely democratic, even as it severely constrained by the form 
and content of debate. It is also important to note that the notion of 
affirmation itself is understood as ministerial in the sense that it 
follows from and ought to reflect the popular 'buy in' resulting from 
the process of mass engagement in the development of the final 
draft. It is in that sense unnecessary and the understanding is that 
only those things (and candidates) that must be approved or 
affirmed would be brought to a vote in the first place.127 Socialist 
consultation produces the consensus and agreement which is a 
predicate for a vote that merely serves as a mechanism for 
memorializing that consensus through a discrete mass act (of 
voting).  
 
 And in the end, Fidel Castro could look at the 
institutionalization of revolutionary political power in the PCC, 
and popular power in the Nacional Assemble and see the 
 
127 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the notion of pre-approval of candidates by 
the ruling Party has been more or less ignored by scholarship, even though a 
similar system is still practiced in China. Scholarship has instead examined notions 
of managed democracy, a more or less direct derivation of the pre -existing system. 
See TIMOTHY J. COLTON & MICHAEL MCFAUL, POPULAR CHOICE AND MANAGED 
DEMOCRACY: THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS OF 1999 AND 2000 (2003) (on Russia). See also 
QINGSHAN FORREST TAN, VILLAGE ELECTIONS IN CHINA: DEMOCRATIZING THE 
COUNTRYSIDE (2006) (on China). 
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perpetuation of a singular popular authority. “Our revolutionary 
process was, from the beginning, profoundly popular and solidly 
rooted in the masses. The first sovereign act of the people was the 
revolution itself."128 But these institutions did not spring forward 
fully formed from the theoretical droppings of Leninist theory 
applied elsewhere (though those might prove useful post hoc). We 
have already encountered the challenge perceived by the Cuban 
revolutionary government after the 2nd Havana Declaration 
respecting the modalities of mass approval assemblies and the 
beginnings of efforts to change the model without endangering (at 
least at a general level) its theoretical (and ideological) premises. 
Those experiments reached a threshold of success in the years 
immediately before they were nationalized through during the 1st 
PCC Congress and then memorialized in the 1976 Constitution. 
Fidel Castro noted their importance in key speeches from 1974, 
referencing for example, the Poderes Populares experiment in 
Matanzas Province. “And another important reason, the emphasis 
that the Revolution desires to give this most important 
revolutionary experiment that is being realized in Matanzas 
Province with the constitution of the Poderes Populares, that you 
people of Matanzas have embraced with such enthusiasm and have 
supported so warmly."129 
 
That experiment could be seen as producing a template for the 
creation of local, provincial and national popular assemblies, and 
in the process replace the mechanism of mass affirmation of the 
people physically present in a large space with a representative 
body. But that movement also triggered the fundamental 
contradiction of representative assemblies—the notion that they 
could not in form or operation, replicate the corruption and class 
exploitation principles of the form which the revolutionary 
government had attacked with such force in the course of the 
genesis of the two Havana declarations. And thus, the need for 
 
128 Translated from Discurso Pronunciado Por Fidel Castro Ruz, Presidente De La 
República De Cuba, En La Sesion Solemne De Constitucion De La Asamblea 
Nacional Del Poder Popular, Celebrada En El Teatro "Carlos Marx", El 2 De 
Diciembre De 1976, "Año Del Xx Aniversario Del Granma". [The Solemn Session 
of the Constitution of the National Assembly of the Popular Power] (Dec. 2, 1976) 
(Statement by Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba) (available at: 
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1976/esp/f021276e.html). 
129 Translated from id. 
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experiment—in its pragmatic but also its fundamental ideological 
dimensions.  
 
As you know, a decision was taken to undertake this 
experiment in this province [Matanzas]. It was an 
experiment in a sense, but not one respecting the decision 
[to proceed itself] or [respecting the] security of our Party 
to carry forward these ideas throughout the country; the 
experiment is precisely to put to the test the methods, the 
mechanisms, the regulations and everything that concerns 
the constitution of the Popular Powers before applying it 
nationally. That is, the experiment will teach us to perfect 
the idea; but the idea is to apply these principles to the 
entire country.130 
 
Part of that also involved the so-called rationalization of the 
provinces, a process that required the subdivision of the traditional 
provinces. The object in part was to make more practical the 
division of provincial popular assemblies in the service of locality, 
state and PCC. “One becomes a little sentimental when one thinks 
about dividing some of the provinces, but tied to that issue is the 
question of the organization of Poderes Populares [popular 
assemblies]. For the adequate establishment of the Poderes 
Populares it is necessary for the size and extent of provinces to be 
more rational."131 
 
Implicit in that rationalization were two insights with political 
effect. The first was that mass assemblies could not be relied on for 
the exercise of popular affirmation of PCC leadership. The second 
was that such assemblies would have to be institutionalized if they 
were to serve the PCC and the administrative apparatus in an 
ideologically useful way. That sovereign affirmation could then be 
 
130 Translated from id.  
131 Translated from Discurso Pronunciado Por El Comandante En Jefe Fidel Castro 
Ruz, Primer Secretario Del Comite Central Del Partido Comunista De Cuba Y 
Primer Ministro Del Gobierno Revolucionario, En El Acto Central En 
Conmemoracion Del Xxi Aniversario Del Ataque Al Cuartel Moncada, Efectuado 
En La Explanada Frente Al Estado Mayor Del Ejercito Central, En Matanzas, El 26 
De Julio De 1974, "Año Del Xv Aniversario". Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in 
Chief of Cuba, Speech delivered to the City of Santa Clara (Jul. 26, 1975), available 
at: http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/1975/esp/f260775e.html. 
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utilized to reconstitute itself pragmatically along institutional lines, 
but one in which sovereign power remains undivided. “Power is 
unified, that of the workers, which is exercised through the 
National Assembly and the state organs which depend on it."132  
 
All of these centripetal forces, the experimentation in large part 
in reaction to outside and internal challenges, produced a long-
term process of solidification the contours of which might have 
been evident early on, but the character of which eventually also 
represented the culmination of reactionary political calculus. Note 
here that this is not to suggest ideological reaction; rather the focus 
is on the nature of the relational dynamics between the 
revolutionary apparatus and the challenges which it confronted in 
its formative years. Those dynamics were politically reactionary 
(one responds pragmatically to political challenges) even as they 
became, in political reaction, ideologically the opposite. To that 
end, this leads to the development of what we call Cuba’s Socialist 
Democracy 1.0, which is the outcome of the internal challenges that 
we have discussed thus far.  
 
F. Socialist Democracy 1.0.  
 
From the late mid-1960s, the search for a form of a collective 
decision-making alternative to multi-party elections proceeded on 
two different levels. At the grassroots-level, the format of the 
plebiscite was maintained and adopted on a much smaller scale, 
through the formation of committees representing neighborhoods, 
and other groups defined along the lines of class, gender, and 
age.133 At the national level, the spontaneity of experiments in 
socialist democracy was encased within a governance model of 
Leninist derivation, emphasizing vertical lines of authority. 
Governance structures realized through political and legal 
cooperation with the Soviet Union were layered over the earlier 
revolutionary and classically Socialist substratum.  
 
 Without doubt, a decisive role in this process was played by 
the merger of Castro’s 26th of July movement with the Popular 
 
132 Translated from id. 
133 Translated from Rojas supra note 65; cf. Buch, supra note 66.  
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Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Director, and the pouring of 
these Caribbean identities in the vessel of the Cuban Communist 
Party. These choices posed the revolutionary government with the 
responsibility to continue to articulate autonomous notions of 
exogenous socialist democracy, while complying with Muscovite 
governance methods based on endogenous socialist democracy. 
The transition to a Soviet-inspired model of state and societal 
governance was largely foreseeable. Muscovite prescriptions had 
already been adopted by the People’s Republic of China, North 
Korea, and Eastern Europe, albeit with varying degrees of success 
and efficiency.  
 
 Less foreseeable, was the temporary side-lining of 
exogenous forms of socialist democracy. Institutionalization and 
the creation of the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular were meant 
to make the workings of the Cuban administrative machinery more 
manageable and efficient, regular, and predictable. The result was 
a measure of compliance with the Soviet model of State 
governance.134 The features common to Soviet forms of endogenous 
democracy and the Cuban Revolution however did not extend 
beyond limitation of the demos along class lines, and leadership by 
a group or a leader that personified the Revolution.135 Therefore, an 
ample space existed to combine Cuban notions of endogenous 
socialist democracy with practices based on the Soviet model. Cuba 
was the only country within the Socialist camp where mass 
affirmation events with a constitutive character were held.136 In 
 
134 Castro Ruz, supra note 101 (Here, direct references to the Soviet version of 
Socialist ideology abound, with the name of Karl Marx being mentioned 7 times, 
that of Lenin 4 times and the Soviet Union characterized as the head of world 
progressivist forces. Such references to Soviet ideology were absent from both the 
First and the Second Havana declarations, where Castro instead mounted a 
vigorous defense of the Cuban nature of the revolution.). 
135 See LESZEK KOŁAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM 792 (P. S. Falla trans., 2d 
ed. 1978). 
136 Michael Bothe, The 1968 Constitution of East Germany: A Codification of Marxist-
Leninist Ideas on State and Government, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 268, 268-291 (1969) (No 
other country adhering to the Soviet Bloc organized a popular referendum 
between the end of World War II, and the fall of the Soviet Union. The only 
exception was the 1968 constitutional referendum held in the German Democratic 
Republic. Despite its formal similarities with the Cuban referendum of 1976, this 
referendum did not play the same role in the construction of notions of socialist 
democracy. By 1968, the GDR had already fully articulated local conceptions of 
socialist democracy.). 
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China, the invocation of the sovereign will of the people had often 
resulted in the undoing of governance institutions, rather than to 
their creation. In the German Democratic Republic, political parties 
were established to provide a safe haven to former Nazis, displaced 
populations, and other categories. Differently from Cuban 
revolutionary assemblies, these parties were not a source of 
constituent power, and therefore their approval of decisions taken 
by the leadership was scarcely relevant.  
 
 In Cuba, the adoption of enduring institutional forms took 
place with an overhaul of the 1959 Ley Fundamental, and 
promulgation of a new Constitution. The 1976 Constitution in turn 
could not come to life without an act of sovereign approval by the 
people. Given the absence of viable models within the Socialist 
camp, institutionalization of mass approval proceeded along the 
path traced by revolutionary practices of mass democracy, the 1940 
Constitution,137 and the Ley Fundamental.138 The manifestation of the 
sovereign, constitutive will of the people developed along two 
partially distinct lines. The first one of them saw approbation of 
decisions taken by the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba 
on behalf of the entire people. The second line of development 
involved popular consultation and referendum vote. An instance 
of approbation is given by the vote on the resolutions of the First 
Congress of the CPC. The rally that took place on the Plaza de la 
Revolución in December 1975139 was not a constitutive rally, given 
manifestations of constitutive power were no longer necessary in 
the face of institutionalization. 
 
 More significant was Cuba’s choice to preserve the 
referendum as a legitimate channel through which the sovereign 
will of the people could continue to find a constructive expression. 
Such a decision stemmed not from an unwilling retention of models 
inspired by liberal democratic constitutional theory,140 but by the 
difficulties in representation caused by mass rallies. If Fidel was 
 
137 Cuba’s Constitution of 1976 with Amendments Through 2002, CONSTITUTE 
PROJECT (2019), 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en.  
138 Id. at art.27-28. 
139 Castro Ruz, supra note 111.  
140 REPUBLICA DE CUBA CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE 1940 (Jul. 1, 1940), available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Cuba/cuba1940.html.  
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searching for forms of “pure” - “pasteurized”, in his words – 
democracy, it soon became clear that mass rallies had limitations 
not compatible with the principles of Cuban socialist democracy. 
The constitutive and non-constitutive mass rallies held until the 
mid-1970s could include fellow Latin Americans in the demos, 
bestowing Cuban political citizenship on persons of non-Cuban 
nationality. But Cubans who lived in the Eastern provinces of the 
Island were routinely excluded from mass events taking place in 
Havana. Their absence was due not to a rejection of their role within 
socialist democracy, but to their mere inability to travel to Havana. 
Thus, they found themselves in a position analogous to those 
whom, in liberal democracies, could not exert their right to vote due 
to illiteracy, poverty, or other socio-economic hurdles.  
 
 A solution was found in submitting the Draft Constitution 
to popular consultation, and then to popular vote. These more 
regular, orderly events could provide the opportunity to 
participate in decision-making to all those who lived in Cuba. The 
soliciting of popular comments on the Draft Constitution took place 
simultaneous to the holding of the First Congress of the Communist 
Party of Cuba, in the spring of 1975.141 To ensure an effective 
participation by the people, these two events had to occur at the 
same time. The resolution to hold the referendum was conveyed 
through the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. 
The Central Committee noted how:142  
  
The First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, in 
consequence, gives its approval to the improved text of 
the Draft Constitution and recommends that it be 
officially published as the Constitution Project of the 
Republic and submitted by referendum to the universal, 
free and secret vote of citizens, together with the 
Constitutional Transit Bill; that the referendum be 
organized so that all citizens with the right to vote have 
the opportunity to vote in it, for which polling places must 
 
141 Fidel Castro Ruz, Commander in Chief of Cuba, Speech Delivered at First Party 
Congress (May 29, 1975), (available at: 
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1975/19750529.html.). 
142 I CONGRESSO DEL PCC: TESIS Y RESOLUCIONES SOBRE LA CONSTITUCÍON Y LEY DE 
TRÁNSITO CONSTITUCIONAL, citing Granma (Dec. 26, 1975), at 3. 
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be established with reference not only to domicile, but 
also to where the voters are located ( . . . )143 
 
This solution preserved the truly essential features of earlier 
forms of exogenous socialist democracy. These were popular 
participation, and leadership responsibility towards the people. 
Popular participation occurred by comments on the Draft 
Constitution – a process that other Marxist-Leninist systems would 
launch much later in China when the government began to increase 
the role of market mechanisms in the economic systems during the 
State-owned enterprise reform of 1979. If data about unofficial 
comments made during the popular consultation on the 2018 
Constitution is available, the same information is not available for 
the 1976 consultation. The feature of leadership responsibility 
towards the people, however, is visible in the results of the 1976 
referendum.  
 
 Popular choice was strongly in favor of the new 
Constitution. On 15th February 1976, 5,602,973 Cuban citizens went 
to the polls. The voter turnout was of 98 percent. Of 5,523,604 valid 
votes, 99.02 percent were in favor of the Socialist constitution,144 
and only 54,070 votes against it. 44,221 ballots were blank, and 
31,148 were annulled. The object of the plebiscite was not to secure 
a majority vote. Majoritarian vote is a feature of multi-party 
systems. Within a Socialist democracy, vote is instead designed to 
provide a signal of the extent to which the Party in power is able to 
effectively fulfil its responsibility of leading the population towards 
their chosen path of development. As seen from this perspective, 
all votes are of equal importance, included the 54,070 votes against 
the 1976 Constitution, blank and invalid ballots. Votes approving 
the 1976 Constitution signaled how 99.02 per cent of Cubans 
believed the Communist Party of Cuba pursued the trajectory of 
change chosen by the people in the best possible way. The other 
 
143 Larry Catá Backer, Part I (Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0; the 1976 Constitution) 
Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional 
Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY 
(Feb. 22, 2019, 11:16 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/part-i-
caribbean-socialist-democracy-10.html.  
144 Beat Müller, Kuba, 15. February 1976: Verfassung [Cuba, Feb 15, 1976: 
Constitution], https://www.sudd.ch/event.php?lang=en&id=cu011976 (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2019) (Ger.). 
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129,439 votes signaled how an equal number of Cubans thought 
that a fine-tuning or re-adjustment in the methods chosen to realize 
Cuba’s path of development may have been necessary. Electoral 
choice then was not performed to approve or deny the leadership 
role of the Communist Party of Cuba, but to provide and obtain 
feed-back on specific methods of governance. After all the 1976 
Constitutional referendum saw Cubans vote on a document they 
had contributed to making through the popular consultation. 
Therefore any vote on the Constitution was, in its truest essence, a 
vote about one’s own goals, and an opinion on the suitability of the 
means chosen to achieve those goals. 
 
  The Constitution of 1976 “conceived of Popular Power as 
an organizational structure of the State, and popular sovereignty 
and socialist democracy”145 as the basic principles of Caribbean 
Marxism-Leninism. The notion of popular power as an 
organizational structure of the state was enshrined throughout the 
Preamble. The most immediate effect of this act of approval was 
encasing popular consultations and referendums within the 
structure of the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular. Popular will 
should have undergone the same process of institutionalization 
and regularization witnessed by other organizational structures of 
Cuba’s governance apparatus. After all, the logic behind the 
Leninist model was geared towards a clockwork regularity and 
predictability of governance processes, and such was also Castro’s 
aspiration. 
 
SOCIALIST CONSULTATIVE DEMOCRACY 2.0, THE 2019 CUBAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT AND ITS HISTORICAL-IDEOLOGICAL 
CONTEXT. 
 
With the transition of government from Fidel to Raúl Castro, 
Cuba saw a more conscious revival of the role of popular 
affirmation in the construction of a political relationship between 
the collective masses and the core governing political vanguard. 
But that revival was undertaken in coordination with renewed 
measures for popular consultations both through the Asamblea as 
 
145 (Teodoro) Yan Guzman Hernández, supra note 114, at 104.  
102 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. Vol. 27:1 
 
a representative organ, and for important matters, for direct 
consultations. If it is clear that popular affirmation is incorporated 
as an important element of Cuban political practice, it is less clear 
what popular affirmation is, and why Cuba’s mechanisms of choice 
are those of the popular consultation and of the referendum.  
 
A. The Road from Socialist Consultative Democracy 1.0 to 2.0. 
 
The core element in the institutionalization of the Cuban 
revolutionary government, and its establishment of its Socialist 
Democracy 1.0, centered on the formal sidelining of mass popular 
gatherings (whose use had been serendipitous since the early 1960s 
in any case), and on the substitution of the Asamblea Nacional as 
an institutional form for popular expression. That substitution, 
however, brought the revolutionary government to adopt the forms 
of liberal democratic representation and in the process, it also 
brought the revolutionary government perilously close to the 
adoption of the principles of liberal democratic governmental 
organization. The revolutionary government was to some extent 
sensitive to these issues in 1976, and Fidel Castro went out of his 
way to declare the difference between the forms of liberal 
democratic legislatures and those of the Asamblea Nacional.146  
 
And not just Fidel Castro. Early on Raúl Castro also sought to 
articulate Soviet Leninist principles to legitimate the construction 
of a system under the leadership of the vanguard party, but also 
one that necessarily was dependent on a relationship between the 
vanguard and the masses (starting with the proletariat, of course, 
in a political worldview shaped by classical Soviet notions of class 
struggle (again without reference to failures of implementation)). 
In a speech given May 4, 1973, Raúl Castro emphasized an 
approach that sought to distance the institutions of proletarian 
dictatorship from the dictatorship of a legislature in liberal 
democracies. 
 
But the dictatorship of the proletariat is not limited in the 
least to the important and main role that the Party must 
 
146 Castro Ruz, supra note 39. 
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play. The Party is only the vanguard minority of the most 
advanced social class in charge of leading and carrying on 
its shoulders the bulk of the weight in the construction of 
socialism. Therefore, in order to exercise its leading role 
visà-vis the entire society, the Party relies on the state, the 
mass organizations and, when necessary, on the direct 
mobilization of the working masses. The most ideal and 
direct instrument for exercising control of society is not a 
political party, but rather the state, an apparatus without 
which neither the dictatorship nor the fulfillment of the 
tasks of socialist construction are possible. In addition to 
the Party and the state, the complete system of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat includes the mass 
organizations, which Lenin called “transmission belts” 
that group together one or many sectors of society’s 
revolutionary forces: the trade unions, youth, women’s 
and peasants’ organizations, the Committees for the 
Defense of Revolution, students and Pioneers. In an 
article written in December 1920, Lenin said that the 
dictatorship “cannot work without a number of 
‘transmission belts’ running from the vanguard to the 
mass of the advanced class, and from the latter to the mass 
of the working people.”147  
 
These notions were built into the mutually reinforcing 
provisions of the 1976 Constitution (revised 2002) which provided 
on the one hand, in Article 5, that "The Communist Party of Cuba, 
Martian and of Marxist-Leninist, the organized vanguard of the 
Cuban nation, is the superior leading force of the society and the 
State, organizing and guiding the common efforts aimed at the 
highest goals of the construction of socialism and advancement 
toward the communist society."148 On the other hand, the 1976 
 
147 Raúl Castro, Commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Speech delivered 
to cadres and officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba 
(May 4, 1973) (transcript available at https://liberationschool.org/07-03-01-
democratic-centralism-in-communi-html/). 
148 CUBA CONST. Art. 5 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project 
trans.), 
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In 
the original: “["El Partido Comunista de Cuba, martiano y marxista-leninista, 
vanguardia organizada de la nación cubana, es la fuerza dirigente superior de la 
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Constitution also provided, in Article 69, that "The National 
Assembly of People’s Power is the supreme organ of State power 
and represents and expresses the sovereign will of all the working 
people."149 And, in Article 70, it provided that "The National 
Assembly of People’s Power is the only organ in the Republic 
invested with constituent and legislative authority."150  
 
And yet the problem remained—and grew substantially in the 
period between 1986 and 2008 when direct popular affirmation and 
engagement became a vestigial part of the operation of the 
administrative apparatus of the state.151 The core operating system, 
the political-economic model guiding state action was established 
in the course of the 4th PCC Congress, which cemented the notion 
of central planning as the core of macro-economic policy and the 
vanguard role of the PCC as both leader and operator of the state.152 
Both consultation and engagement was telescoped into the 
Asamblea Nacional and, to the extent useful, the mass 
organizations already operating under the leadership of the PCC.153 
 
sociedad y del Estado, que organiza y orienta los esfuerzos comunes hacía los altos 
fines de la construcción del socialismo y el avance hacía la sociedad comunista."). 
149 CUBA CONST. Art. 69 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project 
trans.), 
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In 
the original: "La Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular es el órgano supremo del 
poder del Estado. Representa y expresa la voluntad soberana de todo el pueblo."). 
150 CUBA CONST. Art. 70 (1976), as amended through 2002 (Constitution Project 
trans.), 
(https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=en) (In 
the original: "La Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular es el único órgano con 
potestad constituyente y legislativa en la República."). 
151 See, e.g., Jorge I. Domínguez, Cuba in the 1980s, 65:1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (1986) 
(on the operation of the Cuban State-Party system after the 1970s); Juan M. Del 
Águila, Reflections on a Non-transition in Cuba: Comments on Elites, 9 CUBA IN 
TRANSITION 192 (1999); see generally PHILIP BRENNER, MARGUERITE ROSE JIMÉNEZ, 
JOHN M. KIRK & WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE, EDS., A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER: 
REINVENTING THE REVOLUTION (2007); JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND 
REVOLUTION (2009). 
152 See, e.g., GAIL REED, ISLAND IN THE STORM: THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S 
FOURTH CONGRESS (1992)(on the 4th PCC Congress); Juan M. Del Águila, The Party, 
the Fourth Congress, and the Process of Counter-Reform, CUBAN STUDIES 71 (1993). 
153 As for instance the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de 
Defensa de la Revolución), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de 
Mujeres Cubanas), etc. See generally, Benigno E. Aguirre, The Conventionalization of 
Collective Behavior in Cuba, 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 541 (1984)(on mass 
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This was ironic, especially since this period of institutional stability 
was also marked by periods of great political instability, great 
crises, culminating in the disappearance of the Soviet Union and 
the trials of the so-called "Special Period."154 And yet, it was 
precisely during these periods that neither engagement nor 
consultation outside the organs established by the 1st PCC Congress 
was attempted.155 More telling was the paucity of theoretical 
development after the 4th PCC Congress on either point.156  
 
At first glance, the problem appears centered on a concern 
about the corruption of the system from a "right" perspective—that 
is that the national assembly system does not work because one 
cannot extricate the form of the national assembly institution from 
the liberal democratic ideals of representative democracy. If that is 
the case then any mechanism for representation necessarily 
requires autonomous choices by an electorate. And, indeed, that 
had been the way that even the revolutionary government 
approached the issue. 
 
However, it is not clear that the primary problem of the national 
assembly system was the risk of the possibility of "rightist" error 
(that is the possibility that the national assembly system would be 
corrupted by and eventually transform itself into a corrupted form 
of a liberal democratic representative institution). That risk was 
both well understood, and at least partially theorized. To the extent 
 
organizations ); Benigno E. Aguirre, Social Control in Cuba, 44 LATIN AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 67 (2002). 
154 Ernesto Perez Castillo, Cuba’s Special Period: the Bogeyman, HAVANA TIMES (May 
10, 2019) https://havanatimes.org/opinion/cubas-special-period-the-
bogeyman/.  
155 The mechanisms of popular consultation and of the referendum, were not used 
during the special period, despite being the only legitimate channels of popular 
expression in the eyes of the Cuban leadership. The Central Committee of the PCC 
instead adopted a resolution endowing the Committee with special faculties 
(facultades excepcionales), essentially broad powers to adopt the political and 
economic decision needed to face the Special Period. See Resolución que Faculta a 
Comité Central del Partido para Tomar las Decisiones en Correspondencia con la Situación 
que Vive el País, GRANMA (Oct. 23,1991), at 6. 
156 The only document approved by the 4th Congress relevant to political 
participation was a resolution “On Perfecting the Organization and the 
Functioning of National Assemblies of People’s Power” (Sobre el perfeccionamiento 
de la organización y funcionamiento de los órganos del Poder Popular). The resolution 
discussed only procedural aspects of the work of the ANPP.  
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that it continued to exist suggested, especially between 1976 and 
2008, not so much a problem of theory as a problem of failures of 
operationalization. Those failures were either deliberate (the 
leadership apparatus was satisfied with the appearance of a 
mechanism for popular engagement on a institutional basis and its 
propaganda value was great enough), or evidence of a lack of 
capacity to transpose theory into the working style of the PCC and 
its state apparatus.  
 
Instead, the more difficult problem for a system grounded in 
the notions of dictatorship of the proletariat within conditions of 
class struggle, and wary of the effects of the forms of liberal 
democracy comes from the "left" rather than the right. It is inherent 
in the constitution and working style of the PCC itself. Central to 
that problem is the role of democratic centralism as a core element 
of the way in which the PCC operates, and by extension of the form 
of core responsibility PCC members owe the organization in every 
aspect of their political work—either within PCC organs, or in their 
role in the state apparatus—including the Asamblea Nacional.  
 
What does this mean? First, democratic centralism is an ancient 
principle central to the early development of Communist Party 
discipline with origins in the writing of Lenin, and then subject to 
some variation in its adoption by the Communist Parties of states 
worldwide. It provides, broadly, for substantial latitude in debate 
within the party (subject to a number of constraints as to time, 
place, manner and form that can also be used to eviscerate the 
democratic element of the concept in effect), but also the duty of all 
Party members of uphold and carry out the decisions of the Party 
once debate is ended and a vote taken. It suggests that at least 
within the Party, majority voting (in some places the emphasis is 
on consensus rather than majority take all voting) determines 
policy, but once policy is established or a decision taken then no 
deviation is possible, until the next time the issue comes up within 
the Party.  
 
Second, the organization of the PCC is grounded on the central 
role of democratic centralism in its operation and working style.  
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Dicha forma de manifestación encuentra su formulación 
en los Estatutos aprobados en el Primer Congreso: “El 
Partido Comunista de Cuba se estructura orgánicamente 
y funciona de acuerdo con los principios del centralismo 
democrático, que permite combinar la más amplia 
democracia interna y el examen y análisis colectivo de los 
asuntos con la dirección centralizada, la libertad de 
discusión con la unidad ideológica, de voluntad, de 
organización y de acción de todo el Partido”, en ella se 
concreta orgánicamente la disciplina partidista, la 
participación política y el papel del dirigente.157  
 
Third, the obligations of democratic centralism extend not just to 
obedience by Party members within the Party but also with respect 
to their work within state organs.  
 
The Party directs the state, reviews its functioning and its 
fulfillment of the outlined directives and plans; it 
encourages, moves forward and contributes to the best 
work on the part of the entire state mechanism, but under 
no circumstances should the Party substitute for the 
state . . . . 5. It directs them through Party members who, 
regardless of where they work and the position they 
occupy, are obligated to fulfill and implement Party 
decisions and convince nonmembers of the fairness of 
these decisions and the need to follow them. 6. It directs 
them through the circumstances—necessary and 
inevitable for a long time—whereby the main leaders of 
 
157 Eursebio Mariano Hernández García, El Principio del Centralismo Democrático en 
el Proceso de Construcción y Desarrollo del Partido Comunista de Cuba: Su Relación con 
las Concepciones de Vladimir Ilich Lenin y Antonio Gramsci (La Habana: Editorial 
Universitaria, 2015), at 67 [This for of manifestation is found in the Statutes 
approved by the 1st Congress: The Communist Party of Cuba is organically 
structured and functions in accordance with the principles of democratic 
centralism, that permits the amalgamation of the broadest form of internal 
democracy and the collective examination and analysis of matters with centralized 
direction, liberty of discussion within an ideological unity, of good will and of the 
organization and action of the entire Party, in which is made organically concrete 
party discipline, political participation and the leadership role of the Party.] 
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the Party, or at least the majority of them, are also the 
main leaders of the state.158  
 
Fourth, where a majority of the members of the Asamblea 
National are also members of the PCC or its related organs,159 those 
members must under core principles of democratic centralism 
uphold the decisions of the PCC; they represent the Party and act 
in their role as members of the representative vanguard within the 
organs of state (and popular) power. 
 
Fifth, as the graphic above and at the start of this post suggest, 
the great majority of members of the representative assembly are 
subject to the obligations of democratic centralism. If that is the 
case, then the Asamblea National can lose its character as the 
institution in which the engagement with the masses can be 
focused, and rather becomes the site where PCC members may 
consider the application of PCC policy decisions through state 
organs.  
 
Sixth, in that case, then popular assembly may lose its character 
as the site of popular affirmation of PCC policy and decisions. It 
becomes something else. That something else in part is as the site 
of the transposition of PCC policy and ideology into the concrete 
forms of administrative acts. It becomes a legislature. This is not a 
surprise—it was so constructed even within the 1976 Constitution. 
 
Seventh, but so reconstituted, the Asamblea National inevitably 
loses its character as the site of mass expression—even if limited 
under principles of class struggle to the site of proletariat mass 
assembly. It becomes both the site of parliamentary legislation (the 
rightist turn) as well as the administrative expression of the Party 
itself (the leftist turn). The effect is to create an organ of popular 
assembly that is itself in reality the expression of the supreme 
representative capacity of the Party as the expression of the will of 
the proletariat (and thus back to the dictatorship of the proletariat 
conception). 
 
158 Raúl Castro, supra note 149. 
159 See Parlamento Cubano – IX Legislatura, INVENTARIO (Mar. 16, 2019), 
https://proyectoinventario.org/parlamento-cuba-ix-legislatura-anpp/. 
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Eighth, as a result, there is still a need for some mechanism for 
the expression of popular affirmation of the politics and 
administrative expression of governance directed by the PCC as 
organized vanguard of the Cuban nation. We wind up where we 
stared—a Marxist Leninist system in need of a means of a 
mechanism for popular affirmation, and a theory of when such acts 
of popular affirmation are required. 
 
Ninth, the baseline solution proved ironic as well. The 
Reglamentos de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de la República 
de Cuba160 provided two consequential mechanisms for popular 
consultation beyond the actions of the Party-in-State apparatus of 
the Asamblea National. First, the mechanisms of popular affirmation 
are preserved, though now bound by a fairly ambiguous cage of 
regulation. Article 4 delegates to the Asamblea the power to hold 
popular referenda when required by the constitution or otherwise 
at the discretion of the Asamblea.161 Article 80 mandates a 
referendum on the adoption of certain changes to the state 
constitution.162 Lastly, Art. 110 provides for the conduct of 
referenda.163 Second, the Reglamentos add an engagement element 
for mass participation (consulta popular) in the process of 
operationalization of PCC leadership policies. Article 4(b) invests 
the Asamblea with the discretion to seek popular consultation on 
its legislative projects.164 Article 5(l) vests the President, vice present 
and secretary of the Asamblea the power to propose such 
consultation to the Asamblea.165 Article 68(a) vests Asamblea 
commissions charged with legislative projects the power to 
recommend popular consultation with respect to their work,166 or 
by the Asamblea itself.167 (Article 72). 
 
160 Órgano Oficial Del Comité, Reglamentos de la Asamblea Nacional del Poder 
Popular de la República de Cuba (Feb. 2, 2008), 
http://www.granma.cu/granmad/2008/02/24/nacional/artic21.html. 
161 See id. at art. 4(x). 
162 See id. at art. 80. 
163 See id. at art. 110. 
164 See id. at art. 4(b). 
165 See id. at art. 5(i). 
166 "[A]probar el proyecto con enmiendas o sin ellas, pudiendo además 
recomendar en que período de sesiones debe incluirse y si debe someterse a 
consulta popular." Ibid.  
167 Id., art. 72.  
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The irony proceeds from the implications of the solution. First 
it reconstructed the mechanisms of the popular consultation from a 
revolutionary act of performance to a bureaucratized system for 
input and affirmation. We move from the mechanics of the Havana 
Declarations, to the performance of voting affirmation. But more 
importantly, we move from the performance of the affirmation of acts 
wholly undertaken by the proletariat's dictator-representatives (the 
form of the organs of the PCC and of the PCC's state apparatus in 
the form of the Asamblea Nacional) to a process of partial self-
affirmation by interposing the possibility of consultation between 
the PCC's leadership memorialized by the state apparatus in the 
form of law or constitution, and popular action.  
 
But in the end, popular participation by affirmation remains 
wholly subject to the discretion of the leadership elements of the 
political model. And public consultation beyond the Asamblea took 
on a wholly discretionary character. It is in the search for a 
resolution of these challenges, but only after 2008, that the Cuban 
PCC and state apparatus appears to be moving from Socialist 
Democracy 1.0 to Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0, the success 
or failures of which are nicely evidenced in the constitutional 
reform process of 2016-2019. 
 
 What emerges as Cuban Socialist Democracy 2.0 can be seen 
in the practices developed after 2011 even in the absence of a 
unifying theory that incorporated these practices into the 
developing formal expression of the political-economic model of 
the PCC. Popular affirmation has been incorporated in three 
significant changes to the Cuban political and economic model 
since 2011. Consultations were held on the Lineamientos de la 
Political Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución,168 the 
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo 
Socialista, and the Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030: 
 
168 Partido Comunista de Cuba, Lineamientos de la política económica y social del 
partido y la Revolución Para el Periodo 2016-2021 [Guidelines for the Political 
Economy and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution for the Period 2016-
2021] (Jul. 2017), available at 
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Lineamientos%202016-
2021%20Versi%C3%B3n%20Final.pdf.  
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Visión de la Nación, Ejes y Sectores Estratégicos.169 These consultations 
took place in 2001 and 2016. But the extent of affirmation varied—
at their widest with the Lineamientos and at the narrowest with the 
much more overtly political Conceptualzación. With the 2019 
referendum on the Cuban constitution, popular affirmation 
reached its widest scope.  
 
 On April 2011, the 6th Congress released the Lineamientos de 
la Political Económica y Social del Partido y la Revolución 
(Lineamientos).170 The document outlined Cuba’s developmental 
strategy for the years 2016-2021. It contained measures meant to 
reform the model of economic management; macro-economic 
policy; external economic policy; investment; science, technology, 
innovation and environment; social policy; agriculture; industry 
and energy; tourism; transportation; construction and hydrological 
resources; trade. From a modified version of the Lineamientos, in 
July 2017171 the 7th Congress of the CPC approved the 
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo 
Socialista, and the Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030: 
Visión de la Nación, Ejes y Sectores Estratégicos.172 The 
Conceptualización outlined the principles underpinning the Cuban 
economic model, and provided a blueprint for its gradual 
transformation. The Plan 2030 was a tool to guide medium-term 
economic and social development in Cuba. These reform blueprints 
provided the very content of the 2019 constitutional revision.173 Of 
the 224 articles in the Project Constitution, 175 are based on the 
principles and the policy priorities set by the Conceptualización, the 
 
169 CONCEPTUALIZACIÓN DEL MODELO ECONÓMICO Y SOCIAL CUBANO DE DESARROLLO 
SOCIALISTA (Jul. 2017), available 
athttp://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Conceptualizaci%C3%B3n%20del%2
0modelo%20economico%20social%20Version%20Final.pdf.  
170 See supra note 165. 
171 See Partido Comunista de Cuba, Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social 
del Partido y la Revolución Para el Período 2016-2017 (Jul. 2017), available at 
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Lineamientos%202016-
2021%20Versi%C3%B3n%20Final.pdf. For an excellent account of 
the drafting process of these documents, see Ricardo Torres, El Proceso de 
Actualización del Modelo Económico y Social de Cuba, 45 PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 57 
(2017). 
172 See PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO ECONO ́MICO Y SOCIAL HASTA 2030: 
PROPUESTA DE VISIO ́N DE LA NACIO ́N, EJES Y SECTORES ESTRATE ́GICOS (2011).  
173 See BACKER, supra note 3. 
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Lineamientos and Plan 2030. The amendment of 134 articles 
following the popular consultation of 2018 involved a more logical 
organization of many of the former provisions, and the rewording 
of some of the articles that provoked the most polarization among 
the public.  
 
The Lineamientos were discussed in 2011, at assemblies 
organized by base-level party committees, labour organizations, 
and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. A total of 
163,000 popular assemblies were held, involving 8.9 million 
persons. The consultation lead to re-drafting 68 per cent of the 
Lineamientos, and to the addition of 20 reform measures not present 
in the first 291-paragraphs version.174 The most debates measures 
were those related to the elimination of rationing cards, pricing 
policies, transportation, educational and health services and reform 
of the monetary system. The figures for those who abstained from 
popular assemblies, or else joined without bringing a meaningful 
contribution to the discussion are not known. In their absence, no 
hypothesis can be formulated on the deeper causes of citizens’ lack 
of engagement.  
 
 A further round of consultation on a modified version of the 
Lineamientos, the Conceptualización and Plan 2030 was held from 15 
June to 20 September 2016.175 Over 45,000 meetings were organized, 
which by official counts were attended by over 1.5 million 
people.176 Virtually all of the meetings were organized by mass 
organizations tied to the PCC.177 The proposals made in those 
assemblies were sorted, and selected proposals were organized by 
 
174 See VI Congreso PCC (Congresos del PCC, Compendido Informativo Para 
Periodísticas, 2011). http://congresopcc.cip.cu/congresos/vi-congreso-pcc. 
175 Comienza Consulta Popular Sobre el Modelo Cubano de Desarrollo, IPSCUBA (June 16, 
2016), http://www.ipscuba.net/politica/comienza-consulta-popular-sobre-el-
modelo-cubano-de-desarrollo. 
176 Raúl Castro a Sesión Extraordinaria del Parlamento. Son Analizados la 
Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista y los 
Lineamientos de la Política del Partido y la Revolución, VANGUARDIA (May 31, 2017), 
http://www.vanguardia.cu/de-cuba/9153-raul-castro-a-sesion-extraordinaria-
del-parlamento. 
177 Oscar Sánchez Serra, Ruta democrática y participativa, ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL 
PODER POPULAR, REPÚBLICA DE CUBA (May 30, 2017), 
http://www.parlamentocubano.gob.cu/index.php/ruta-democratica-y-
participativa/. 
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the Centro de Estudios Sociopolíticos y de Opinión and the Permanent 
Commission. Nothing is known, however, about the proposals that 
were not accepted, and of the reasons why those proposals were 
made.  
 
The reform process launched by the 6th Congress and 
continued by the 7th Congress saw three distinct steps.178 Each step 
of the reform process was marked by the holding of a popular 
consultation on the measures to be implemented. Each one of the 
reform packages proposed between 2011 and 2018 saw inputs by 
the masses prior to their adoption by the CPC and the ANPP. The 
process concluded with the Constitutional referendum of 2019. 
Excluding the constitutional referendum, a total of three popular 
consultations took place in the narrow space of eight years. This 
frequency, breadth and depth of popular engagement in re-making 
Cuba’s mode of social and economic development is historically 
unprecedented. Apart from the specifics of social and economic 
reform, this entire process speaks to the revamping of Cuba’s 
socialist democracy, and its reliance on an autonomous and 
sustainable version of the “mass line”.  
 
 
In releasing the Project Constitution to the public, the Cuban 
leadership placed quite specific borders on both engagement and 
on affirmation. These were grounded on a specific set of 
constitutional principles and reforms. These formed the broader 
institutional narrative that framed the presentation of the Project 
Constitution to the Cuban and global public. The main elements of 
this narrative can be extracted from the Introduction to the Analysis 
 
178 For a longer history of this process, which began in the 1990s, see Jaime García 
Ruiz, Reforma de los Noventa y Actualización del Socialismo en Cuba: 
Continuidad y Ruptura/Reforms in the 90's and Socialism Updating in Cuba: 
Steadiness and Breaking 149 1 REVISTA ECONOMI ́A Y DESARROLLO (IMPRESA) 35 
(2018) (discussing elements of continuity and discontinuity); Marcos Antonio da 
Silva, Cuba: Revolução e Reforma, 10 THE INT’L J. OF CUBAN STUD. 119 (2018).  
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of the Project of Constitutional Reform,179 and from the Glossary180 
explaining the contextual meaning of key concepts in the 
Constitution. They concern the twelve aspects of: the role of the 
Communist Party of Cuba in governance; the notion of socialist rule 
of law; property rights; guarantees to civil, political, social, cultural 
and economic rights; notions about equality; administrative 
remedies; citizenship; constitutional equilibria among state organs 
at the central level; reforms of the local state; the electoral system; 
national security and defense; the process of constitutional 
reform.181 These then provided the guidance necessary for officials 
moderating the formal meetings at which consultation occurred, 182 
as well as shaping the summaries prepared for and limiting the 
debates in the Asamblea Nacional. 183 
 
Three differences in content and format exist between the 
plebiscitarian meetings of the 1960s, and public consultations of the 
2000s, and 2019 Constitutional referendum. First and foremost is 
the adoption of modes of consultation based on an informed 
popular discussion of governance reforms. The format adopted 
involves the publication of draft documents, and their distribution 
in both printed and electronic versions. The next step is the 
convening of meetings held at grass-roots levels – in schools, 
 
179 Introducción al Análisis del Proyecto de Constitución de la República Durante la 
Consulta Popular, GRANMA (Aug. 21, 2018), http://www.granma.cu/reforma-
constitucional/2018-08-21/introduccion- al-analisis-del-proyecto-de-
constitucion-de-la-republica-durante-la-consulta-popular-21-08-2018-18-08.  




182 Popular meetings about the constitutions were moderated by two “[C]itizens 
of proven preparation and honesty” who also prepared the minutes, transcribing 
the main points and contents of popular discussion. The organization of popular 
meetings has been described by Yeilén Delgado Calvo, ¿Cómo se procesarán las 




183 Deputies at the ANPP received a summary of the process of popular 
consultation, rather than complete data. On this point, see Libia Miranda 
Camellón, Yurisander Guevara, Loraine Bosch Taquechel & Abel Rojas Barallobre, 
Cobertura Especial: Presentan a los Diputados Resumen del Proceso de Consulta Popular 
del Proyecto de Constitución, JUVENTUD REBELDE (Dec. 18, 2018), 
http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2018-12-18/cobertura- especial.  
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hospitals, factories, neighborhoods. Second, is the appreciation of 
disagreement, understood as the existence of a variety of opinions 
on the specific content of reform blueprints. As stated by Raúl 
Castro, processes of consultation that are not unanimous are 
“precisely what we need if we really want to reach a democratic 
and a serious consultation”.184 Third, is the renewed responsibility 
for the Communist Party of Cuba to posit itself as the vanguard of 
a more articulated, complex system of popular engagement. For 
Cuban socialist democracy, the conventional criticism of popular 
consultations grounded on the people’s lack of technical expertise 
in governance processes ought to matter little. The gathering and 
filtering of popular comments should involve “translating” 
valuable ideas expressed through ordinary language into the 
technical vocabularies of the respective domains of governance.  
 
 The constitution of Cuban Socialist Consultative 
Democracy 2.0 thus emerges from practice. It consists of a 
coordinated interaction between the state and party organs and the 
people under well managed circumstances. Proposals and policies 
originate with the PPC, the guiding political vanguard in power. It 
is then considered and modified by state and popular 
representatives. Only then is it circulated for mass consideration. 
But it is circulated; and responses, however well curated, are 
transmitted to the authorities. There is evidence that at least within 
a narrow band, such popular engagements helped produce 
modification.185 The entire process sis overseen by the PCC and 
administered through its state apparatus and the mass 
 
184 This idea was expressed with reference to the popular consultation held on the 
Lineamientos, but it can be considered representative of the rhetorical approach of 
the Cuban leadership to processes of popular consultation in general. The 
complete statement was, “Quiero con esto exponer que, aunque como tendencia 
existió en general comprensión y apoyo al contenido de los lineamientos, no hubo 
unanimidad ni mucho menos y eso era precisamente lo que necesitábamos, si de 
verdad pretendíamos una consulta democrática y seria con el pueblo.” See Informe 
Central al VI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba (I), CUBADEBATE (Apr. 17 2011), 
http://www.cubadebate.cu/congreso- del-partido-comunista-de-cuba/informe-
central-al-vi-congreso-del-partido-comunista-de-cuba-i/.  
185 Oscar Figueredo Reinaldo, José Raúl Concepción, Dianet Doimeadios Guerrero, 
Edilberto Carmona Tamayo & Irene Pérez, ¿Cuáles son los principales cambios en el 
Proyecto de Constitución? (+ Infografía), CUBADEBATE (Dec. 21, 2018), 
http://www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2018/12/21/cuales-son-los-principales-
cambios-en-el-proyecto-de-constitucion/#.XVsTkFB7nXQ.  
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organizations constituted by the state and the PCC. Once this 
process of popular consultation is finished, the document, policy or 
action is finalized by the popular assembly under the guidance and 
direction of the PCC. Only then is the action set for popular 
affirmation. That combination of an ordered sequence of popular 
consultation followed by popular affirmation is the essence of 
Cuban Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0. In form and 
appearance it has developed substantially from its first steps in the 
early period 1960-1976. But conceptual problems and challenges 
remain; and it remains a practice without a theory. Some of the 




B. The Contradictions of Voting in Cuban Marxist-Leninism; 
Situating Popular Assent within an Ideological Cage. 
 
The question worth considering then, is what exactly is the 
ideology of voting and of representation at the base of the 
construction of the Party and state apparatus after 1975? (Assuming 
of course that much has happened since its “big bang” with the 1st 
PCC Congress)? What is also worth considering are the related 
questions: to what extent does this ideology augment the difficulty 
of cross systemic discussion, and then the extent to which it is 
worth considering whether the current constitutional project lives 
up to its ideological principles in fact? Left for another time is the 
harder question: might this ideological system posit a view of 
democracy that might itself be legitimately viable in relevant 
context.  
 
The development of a Cuban Leninist ideology of voting had 
one constant—the leading role of the core revolutionary group that 
ousted the pre-1959 government. The manner in which that 
leadership role was to be asserted, and how it was to be eventually 
institutionalized, proved to be a more uncertain task than might 
have been expected. And of course, much of it was undertaken not 
from a positive but from a reactive framework; to some extent what 
was fashioned was as much a product of U.S. initiatives as it was of 
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Cuban reaction.186 Sadly, though, that dynamic has set the pattern 
of ideological and institutional development in Cuba that continues 
to structure state, government and ideology. Irrespective, by the 
middle of the 1970’s the ideological and institutional course had 
been set by what had been a more free-form revolutionary 
government—it was to embrace some version of orthodox (for its 
time and then set in stone) European Marxist-Leninist structure 
founded on what would become a more well-defined Caribbean 
variation of Marxist ideology.  
 
That leadership role, however, was from the first meant to be 
attached to popular participation in some form. What emerged 
early on, from 1960, was that this popular participation was to have 
little relation to the forms or ideologies of liberal democratic states. 
Yet, the revolutionary group's early experiments (or uncharitably 
its publicity stunts) have also distinguished its approach to popular 
participation from those of other Marxist-Leninist states. Indeed, 
and ironically enough, there appeared to be more concern about the 
operation of what in China would be called the “mass line” (the 
principle of “from the people to the people”)187 in the early period 
of the Cuban revolutionary government than there was in more 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist states.188 The notion here from the first 
 
186 The Cuban political line has been built through a series of reactions to the 
United States, and to the perceived external environment. The most important 
dimensions of this process have been analyzed by MARIA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES, 
IN THE LAND OF MIRRORS: CUBAN EXILE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), 
discussing the aspect of national security; Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban 
Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 597 (1963), examining the impact of 
Cold War dynamics on the making of the Cuban regime, and finally PHILIP W. 
BONSAL, CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE UNITED STATES (1971) for an exclusive focus on 
the relation between the United States and Cuba. 
187 See the classical studies by ALAN P. LIU, MASS CAMPAIGNS IN THE PEOPLES 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1981) (for an illustration of the mass line principle and its 
implementation,); see also Arthur H. Steiner, Current “Mass Line” Tactics in 
Communist China, 45 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 422 (1951). 
188 Within the Soviet Bloc, the monopoly on ideological orthodoxy was detained 
by the Soviet Union. By the time Cuba was performing experiments in direct 
democracy, de-stalinization had already occurred in the Soviet Union, and events 
involving mass mobilization no longer took place. Likewise in China, the Cultural 
Revolution was coming to an end. See DONALD A. FILTZER, THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA: 
DE-STALINIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF REFORM IN THE USSR 1953-64 (1993) (on the 
Soviet Union); see also POLLY JONES, THE DILEMMAS OF DE-STALINIZATION (2006) (for 
a more recent analysis). For a general study of the cultural revolution, see RODERICK 
MACFARQUHAR, THE ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (VOL. 1-3) (1974). 
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appeared to be to embed popular participation within the structures 
of the leadership of the revolutionary government, and thereafter 
within those of the Communist Party-State. But until that 
leadership structure (and its institutions) was established and 
settled, it would be impossible to expect much stability to the 
corresponding notions (or practices) of popular participation. That 
settlement came with the 1st Communist Party Congress and the 
1976 Cuban Constitution and its establishment both of the 
institution of the revolutionary government within the Cuban 
Communist Party and the institutionalization of popular 
participation within the structures of the National Assembly of 
Popular Power. The organization of popular participation within 
the structures of the National Assembly of Popular Power, the 
Cuban Democratic Socialist Model 1.0 described above, however, 
tell us little about the ideological character of popular participation. 
Moreover, it appears to add a layer of confusion respecting the 
forms through which popular participation is manifested. So, let us 
try to start at the ideological beginning. 
 
From the time the revolutionary group rolled into Havana in 
the early days of 1959, it was confronted with a core ideological 
problem—how to remain revolutionary and how to be democratic. 
To do both required a considerably long journey away from the 
structures of liberal democracy that were even then taking 
definitive shape (though they had not yet by any means taken that 
definitive orthodox shape then). But it was not clear that the road 
would necessarily lead inevitably to an identity with what was 
passing for the ideological structures of European Marxist-
Leninism (already weakened in fact (e.g., Hungary 1956),189 despite 
(or because of) a long and intense effort at a theoretical elaboration 
of a system that was meant to be profoundly liberal and democratic 
(and which in fact was neither).190 On the other hand, Marxist-
Leninism provided the revolutionary government with the one key 
ingredient it needed if it were to try to perpetuate its rule without 
appearing (theoretically) to descend into the common mud pit that 
 
189 See GYO ̈RGY LITVA ́N, JA ́NOS M. BAK, AND LYMAN HOWARD LEGTERS, EDS. THE 
HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956: REFORM, REVOLT AND REPRESSION, 1953-1963 
(1996) (on the Hungarian Revolution). 
190 See generally KARL POPPER, THE LESSON OF THIS CENTURY: WITH TWO TALKS ON 
FREEDOM AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE (2013) (For all the philosophical and logical 
reasons outlined within). 
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was Latin American dictatorships).191 To that end an ideology was 
necessary, and the appearance of an avoidance of a cult of 
personality (the caudillo effect so well known within the ancient 
boundaries of the old Spanish Imperium). And it needed some 
connection with democratic institutions as well, both because the 
revolutionary party rode to power in part on that promise, and 
because that too might present an avenue for longevity.  
 
The first efforts at the assertion (tightly controlled of course) of 
direct democratic authority produced a number of insights. The 
first was that the practice or direct democracy tended to serve as an 
important method for the management of the direct connection 
between the revolutionary government and the people. The second 
was that the physical performance of direct democracy was not 
then possible, except for extraordinary events. We leave for another 
day whether technology has now made possible in cyber spaces 
what the revolutionary government attempted to do in physical 
space. The third was the development of a distinct view of the 
meaning and practice of voting. The fourth was that alternatives 
were necessary to develop at least theoretical connections between 
the revolutionary government and the people. To that end, the 
rudimentary modalities of supervision could also be used as a 
means of acquiring information about popular sentiment with 
respect to revolutionary government initiatives. The fifth was that 
a mechanism was necessary to establish two sets of institutions—
the institutionalization of the revolutionary government and the 
institutionalization of popular participation—which required a 
further refinement of the meaning and practice of voting. The sixth 
was a need to preserve direct popular participation in 
extraordinary cases (following the model of the Havana 
Declarations). Lastly, the seventh was to be able to distinguish both 
voting and participation from its counterparts in liberal democratic 
states. To fail to make that distinction was to open the Cuban state 
apparatus (and rightly) to the criticism that it was merely creating 
showcase institutions and events with no real meaning to cover up 
 
191 See, e.g., GRETCHEN HELMKE AND STEVEN LEVITSKY EDS. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA (2006) (on Latin American 
caudillismo). 
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the structures of dictatorship (criticisms that echo strongly in the 
Aparicio Otero opinion essay. 192 
 
Reduced to its essence, however, these insights turned, in their 
ideological manifestations on two principal elements—voting and 
participation of the people. At first glance one might be tempted to 
say voting is voting. There can be little ideologically to quibble 
about voting except its object. And in that respect both Caribbean 
Marxism and liberal democracy agree. Where liberal democracy 
sees contests among factions (political parties, for example, but also 
interest groups and the like), Caribbean Marxist Leninism sees the 
use of voting to mask a dictatorship built along class lines.193 
Caribbean Marxist-Leninists, then, view voting as the means by 
which the class dominance of (in their view) capitalist elites can be 
maintained by providing the appearance of choice and political 
clashes over policy while masking that those clashes actually 
ensured that the same ruling class continued in power (whatever 
the voter's choices among policy options).194 That provided no 
choice but reinforced the class corruption at the heart of which was 
the voting system that served as the foundation of liberal 
democratic practice itself. Thus, to vote for any particular candidate 
was to vote for a different mask behind which the same class ruled. 
If that was the case, then both the issue of representation and the 
issue of voting presented substantial obstacles to popular 
participation. For them, the way around the problem involved 
three distinct elements. 
 
The first was voting as an act of affirmation or rejection. Voting was 
to tie the regulation of voting to the guidance of a revolutionary 
party committed (and in theory at least obliged to ensure) that all 
actions be drawn to further the fundamental goals of the society. If 
that was the case, then voting moved from democratic to corporate 
principles—and the revolutionary government (and later the PCC) 
transformed itself from a revolutionary system of soviets to a board 
 
192 Jaime Aparicio Otero, Apariencias Cubanas: La Constitución que se Vota Hoy en la 
Isla es Una Obra de Ingeniería Política para Seguir Controlando el Poder, EL PAÍS (Feb. 
24, 2019), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/22/opinion/1550860771_801464.html (last 
visited Aug.. 6, 2019). 
193 Supra note 51. 
194 Castro Ruz, supra note 39. 
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of directors required to obtain shareholder approval of actions they 
initiated. The revolutionary party itself however would be self-
regulated, internally responsible only to itself. It would follow that 
direct popular participation through voting would be limited to the 
purpose of affirming and rejecting the actions put to them for a vote. 
In the context of the constitutional plebiscite, the idea would be that 
the proposed constitution could be affirmed or rejected by the 
voters and if rejected that would signal that the leadership of the 
PCC as well as of the people's representatives in the Asamblea del 
Poder Popular had also failed in their leadership. In theory that also 
ought to produce a crisis of leadership requiring purges of the 
leadership group who failed in their responsibilities. At the 
margins, limited affirmation should also send strong signals that 
the PCC would be obliged to recognize and to which it ought to 
respond. But these theoretical possibilities, inherent in emerging 
Leninist theories of collective engagement remain largely 
unexplored in Cuban theory.195  
 
The second was the voting for the representatives of popular power in 
local and national assemblies. Here voting posed the greatest 
challenge for the Cuban revolutionary government—how to 
distinguish popular voting for representatives to a legislative 
national and local assembly for the elections at the heart of liberal 
democratic states. Here, again, the idea was to move from the 
liberal democratic baseline of voting for one of several competing 
candidates, each competing on the basis of personal agendas and 
qualifications, to one of affirming the selection by the ruling 
leadership of a slate of candidates. Here again, the act of voting is 
detached from the act of choosing to the act of affirming a set of 
choices made under the guidance of the ruling party. The idea is 
that such candidates could be affirmed (elected) and removed by 
the people as they liked, but that those choices would be made 
 
195 At its limit, of course, the issue intersects with the more commonly studied 
question of participation and dissidence in socialist states. That does not quite get 
to the problem of the obligation of the vanguard in the face of invited popular 
expression, though it suggests its contours. See, e.g., Christian Joppke, Revisionism, 
Dissidence, Nationalism: Opposition in Leninist Regimes, 45 THE BRITISH J. OF 
SOCIOLOGY 543-561 (1994). On Cuba in the last stages of the period of Fidel Castro’s 
leadership, see, e.g., RAFAEL HERNANDEZ, MIA A CUBA: ENSAYOSSOBRE CULTURA Y 
SOCIEDAD CIVIL [LOOKING AT CUBA: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY] 
(Editorial Letras 1999); reviewed in English Jorge I. Dominguez, An Increasingly 
Civil Cuba, 120 Foreign Policy Issue 101-102 (Washington Sept./Oct. 2000).  
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under the shadow of the overarching obligation by voters and the 
PCC to select and retain only those representatives committed to 
the economic and political model and the long-term objectives 
toward which the state was obliged to move. This makes perfect 
sense within a Marxist-Leninist framework, where the fundamental 
commitment is to move the state and society toward the goal of 
establishing (or in the case of Cuba of preserving specified 
elements) of a communist society. The only way around that was 
not through elections (this is the case in liberal democracies as well) 
but through a revolutionary act that overcomes the basic economic 
and political model. 
 
The third was the shifting of the focus of democratic accountability 
from voting to participation (within the strict boundaries of the 
political and economic model). Voting as affirmation becomes more 
palatable (perhaps) when what is to be affirmed is the product of a 
substantial amount of popular consultation. It is this thinking that 
makes plausible this quote: "Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno 
Rodriguez also exercised his right, announcing on Twitter that he 
voted for the continuity of the Cuban Revolution. “I defended a 
Constitution that is the result of a collective project with a ‘Yes,’ 
which reaffirms the will of the majority, and which protects the 
future of my family and of the heroic people ratifying the 
independence and sovereignty of socialist Cuba.”196 Of course that 
is true only to the extent that the consultation is deep enough, and 
effective enough to warrant public trust. And it will evidence its 
tolerance of popular voices by the extent to which it encourages or 
acknowledges opinions and suggests inimical to the proffered 
guidance. But the theory at least suggests that a comprehensive 
enough process for effective consultation that produces changes 
invokes a democratic accountability that reduces the centrality of 
voting to the construction of democratic mechanisms.197 Of course, 
the chasm between theory and practice may be broad. But if there 
is a theory that justifies, then the issue changes complexion, at least 
in terms of any legitimacy argument.  
 
196 Cuba Celebra los 55 Años de la II Declaración de La Habana, TELESUR (2017), 
https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cuba-celebra-los-55-anos-de-la-II-declaracion-
de-La-Habana-20170202-0032.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). 
197 Larry Catá Backer & Miaoquiang Dai, Socialist Constitutional Democracy in the 
Age of Accountability (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author). 
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These three theoretical approaches to voting, then, permit a 
more rigorous consideration of Cuban practice on its own terms. 
Clearly, the core understanding of the role and practice of voting 
within the Cuban political model raises significant issues. But it also 
suggests that the usual criticism grounded in the deviation between 
Cuban practice and the ideal model of liberal democracy also 
reduces itself to be a farce. Everyone can agree that Cuba's system 
does not conform to the theory or practice of liberal democracy. But 
the Cubans would tell you this themselves. If that is all one was 
looking for then there is no point in investing any more time in the 
matter, and one moves back to the issue of "transition."198 But if 
instead we move to the question of the theoretical possibility of 
democratic structures in systems grounded in popular affirmation 
and consultation, then the issues become far more interesting.  
 
More interesting still are the host of issues around the question: 
whether the current constitutional project lives up to its ideological 
principles in fact. Within the constitutional project itself the 
principal questions ought to go to the extent and value of the 
popular consultations, both at the time of the reconceptualization 
of the economic and political model before the 7th PCC Congress 
and thereafter in the context of constitutional reform. Also 
important is the extent to which those consultations are 
transparent—for example circulating the public and formal 
consultations presented to the National Assembly—it is too late in 
the day to claim that this is not possible given the sophistication of 
the state's web presence. Lastly, the balloting for the affirmation 
and the consequences to those who voted "no" would be of interest. 
Related to this is the issue of the state with respect to a failure to 
capture a large affirmation.199 How much affirmation is enough to 
provoke a review and reform of the proffered text? Yet these are 
questions that become possible to consider only once considers the 
 
198 Jon Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative 
Perspective on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 THE GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 1219, 1229 (2009). 
199 Marc Frank & Nelson Acosta, Cubans Expected to Voice Unprecedented Opposition 
in Constitutional Vote, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2019, 11:12 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-constitution/cubans-expected-to-
voice-unprecedented-opposition-in-constitutional-vote-idUSKCN1QA275?il=0 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2019). 
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possibility that there is an ideological possibility for the 
construction of democratic models are do not conform to the 
principles of liberal democratic states as these have been refined 
since 1945.  
 
The problem of voting, then, touches on a core theoretical issue 
in Marxist-Leninist systems. In the absence of a clearly developed 
Socialist theory of voting, it is difficult to avoid a drifting back to 
the basic principle of liberal democratic orders—that in voting 
majorities take all and move on. But if voting is to take a Socialist 
character, and if affirmation is directed to the vanguard, then the 
relationship of voting to the obligations the voting raises has to be 
recast. Voting ought to be better aligned with the fundamental issue 
of the responsibilities of a Leninist vanguard. That it has not 
suggests a deep challenge for the development of Cuban Socialist 
Democracy 2.0. That is captured nicely by the challenge for the 
vanguard of confronting negative votes or abstentions.  
 
C. The Caveats. 
 
The constitution of a form of Socialist Consultative Democracy 
out of the practices of popular consultation and popular affirmation 
raise a number of questions that are still searching for answers. 
Beyond the fundamental problem of voting, discussed above, are 
first, the problem of engagement; and the second is the problem of 
the representation of popular power. Each is briefly considered in 
turn. 
 
The problem of engagement is at the core of both liberal 
democratic and socialist systems. Engagement can ring as hollow 
in both—especially in the face of the management of the process of 
engagement by those leadership collectives in control.200 And, of 
course, the issues regulatory capture and of barriers to participation 
are well known in the West—which explains the great efforts to 
conflate democracy and elections and soft pedal the value of 
engagement in liberal democratic governance. But for Socialist 
systems the problems can be identified with more precision. First, 
 
200 These systems of hollow engagement are reproduced all the way down the 
economic and social order of liberal democracies. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 123. 
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the role of the PCC and its management of popular consultation 
raises substantial issues. The first is that PCC and state managed 
consultation may produce the results desired. In other words that 
such management may produce responses that the vanguard wants 
to hear rather than those that the vanguard ought to hear; a 
problem that mirrors that of liberal democracies.201  
 
The second is a problem of technology.202 The way in which 
engagement is undertaken in Cuba bespeaks the 19th rather than the 
21st centuries. The continued reliance on mass organizations, and 
on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution suggest a 
reliance on physical presence. That reliance makes little sense in 
technologically developing states, at least in part in the case of 
Cuba. Moreover, the use of particular mechanisms, especially mass 
organizations and the like ensure that there will be a certain chilling 
effect—similar to that where an employee is asked to be frank about 
the shortcomings of the person who can terminate their 
employment. Tech and consultation remain in a very early stage of 
development, and appeared only in the context of state observed 
but less directly managed informal consultations.203 Moreover, the 
issues of the Cuban diaspora, and of foreign influences, now at the 
forefront of much discussion globally, is hardly on the Cuban radar. 
That, in turn, suggests the difficulties of filtering engagement. 
Beyond the diaspora, the role of those officials charged with the 
collection, summaries and delivery of selected interventions poses 
a substantial challenge for decision makers. Filtering without 
supervision can substantially distort the process. While that may 
produce pleasant results, it will likely also reduce the legitimacy of 
the process and therefore its value to the elite.  
 
201 Problems in surveys of popular opinion and, more generally speaking, other 
modes of consultation have been widely analyzed for over four decades by 
political scientists in liberal democracies. See Paul Perry, Certain Problems in 
Election Survey Methodology, 43 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 312 (1979). For an 
analysis of more recent issues, see Jean-Rémi. Lapaire, Why Content Matters. 
Zuckerberg, Vox Media and the Cambridge Analytica Data Leak, 10 ANTARES: LETRAS E 
HUMANIDADES 88 (2018). 
202 On the relationship between technology and democracy generally, see DANIEL 
LEE KLEINMAN, ED. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEMOCRACY (2000). 
203 Larry Catá, Backer, Flora Sapio & James Korman, The Democratic Constitution of 
Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation, 
Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba, 34 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
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The problem of the representation of popular power has yet to 
confront the challenges that were built into the system when it was 
established after the 1st PCC Congress in 1976. The Asambleas now 
appear to be a dual-purpose entity. To some extent, it serves to 
implement (and give a stamp of popular interaction) with the acts 
of the state and Party apparatus. At the same time, it has been used 
largely as a site for capturing popular affirmation in all but the most 
important projects. If, in fact, the Asamblea is both the site for 
consultation and affirmation, its effects and relation to popular 
consultation and affirmation remains to be resolved. But there is no 
theory here that may help. As in so many other aspects of political 
practice in Cuba—there is much practice in search of a theory, and 
much decision making in search of a cage of principles that might 
organize, legitimate and constrain the exercise of discretion in 
accordance with the political and economic model.  
 
The role of the Asamblea is also complicated by issues of 
vertical and horizontal coherence. First, it is not clear how authority 
will be divided between the national, provincial and local bodies.204 
Second, the role of nomenklatura and Asamblea in the context of 
affirmation and consultation remains unclear, all the more so 
without an approved theoretical foundation.205 The issue of 
representation as between the State, the Asamblea and the PCC 
itself also remains both unresolved and dynamic.206 Lastly, there is 
a substantial gulf between the role of non PCC members and the 
Party which is evidenced in very different ways even among 
 
204 Constitución de La República de Cuba, 
http://www.granma.cu/file/pdf/gaceta/Nueva%20Constituci%C3%B3n%2024
0%20KB-1.pdf; Marc Frank, Explainer: What is old and new in Cuba's proposed 
constitution (February 21, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-
constitution-explainer/explainer-what-is-old-and-new-in-cubas-proposed-
constitution-idUSKCN1QA273.  
205 John N. Hazard, The Common Core of Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 19 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 297, 305 (1981) (discussing the theoretical foundation of socialist 
constitutions is set in their preamble. All constitutions of the countries belonging 
to the former Soviet Bloc follow the constitutional model of the now defunct Soviet 
Union. Cuba in not an exception and yet, the Preamble of the 2019 Constitution 
makes no mention of the ANPP or of the nomenklatura system). 
206 Id. Generally speaking, the reform process that started in Raúl Castro’s era 
focused on the economic aspects of governance, neglecting the development of 
Caribbean Marxist-Leninist theory. 
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Marxist Leninist states. Cuba does not have a United Front 
apparatus which is a central element of Chinese governance.207 But 
China has less interest in Cuba’s move toward popular 
consultation-affirmation mechanisms and the connection to mass 
organizations with that process.208 China’s United Front 
incorporates popular expression in a different way. The variation 





The project of Cuban constitutional reform is not merely about 
alignments of normative values and policies between the 
government and the vanguard PCC. The revised constitution, and 
the three critical documents that have reframed the normative 
structures of the Cuban political-economic system—Lineamientos, 
Conceptualización, and PNDES—on which it is based, have also 
pointed to the substantial development of Cuban practices of 
popular engagement. That is, the three have had a substantial effect 
on the practice of governance as much as they have had an effect 
on the normative content of government.  
 
Popular participation and representation are the great 
antipodes of contemporary democratic theory.209 The former 
embodies the principle that political power resides in the 
individual; the latter that in the exercise of political authority such 
power must be delegated and exercised in a fiduciary capacity for 
the community of individuals. Yet representative delegation 
dilutes popular authority and requires regimes of accountability 
beyond elections; but popular control produces majoritarian 
 
207 A. DOAK BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST 
CHINA, 198 (1967); ANNE-MARIE BRADY, MARKETING DICTATORSHIP: PROPAGANDA 
AND THOUGHT WORK IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, 25 (Mark Selden eds., (2008).  
208 A survey of research article on Cuban politics published in the People’s 
Republic of China from 1980 to 2018 revealed that no studies on the referendum 
in Cuba have been published. Data were surveyed on the China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure Database (CNKI) oversea.cnki.net.  
209 See STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION (2012) (discussing contemporary democratic theory). 
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tyranny if unconstrained. In the construction of mediating 
institutions—governments and vanguard institutions mostly— 
political communities have drawn on a variety of theories that have 
sought to reconcile these core principles in the construction of 
government that is accepted as legitimate and thus whose authority 
over the polity may be asserted even without individual consent.210 
Liberal democracies have moved from the concept of the 
embodiment of political self-constitution as incarnated in the body 
of a person (the Greek monos arkhein) to its incarnation within the 
body (res) of the people (publicus). But that incarnation, as well, has 
been situated within vanguard organizations—aristos kratia—the 
characteristics of which have undergone tremendous ideological 
transformation since the time of the Roman Republic211—with its 
most powerful current expressions as liberal republican, Marxist 
Leninist vanguardist, transnational multilateralist organization. 
 
Global concern over the shape and direction of democratic 
theory and its expression in states have intensified.212 Liberal 
democratic states, once comfortably secure in the expression of an 
orthodox view of what democracy meant and how it was 
expressed, have had those beliefs challenged by internal actions 
that appear to challenge the core premises of democratic states—
populism (left and right), foreign interventions, and the increasing 
willingness of political actors to test the frontiers of structures and 
institutions of government have all appeared to pose significant 
threats to the integrity of democratic theory and practice. This has 
caused anxiety throughout the democratic world—and certainly 
among the intelligentsia in their self-assumed role as guardians of 
theory and monitors of the legitimacy of practice. In its most 
spectacular forms, this has produced great contests over the 
legitimacy of democratic practice—mostly in smaller and more 
fragile states. While Venezuela ended 2018 and started 2019 as the 
most extreme expression of that anxiety in action, many, in 
virtually every other state have become concerned about the state 
of democratic theory and practice. In these cases, foreign 
 
210 Id. 
211 John North, Politics and Aristocracy in the Roman Republic, 85 4 CLASSICAL 
PHILOLOGY 277, 277-87 (1990). 
212 See generally Nikolaj Nielsen, Brexit Vote Manipulated, Says Data Whistleblower, 
EU OBSERVER (Mar. 25, 2018), https://euobserver.com/justice/141470 (examining 
concerns over how the democratic “Brexit” vote was carried out). 
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interventions and internal instability appear to remind us all of the 
dangers of failing to meet the challenges to the stabilizing and 
legitimating core of theory and practice.  
 
Despite the sometimes-expressed conceit of contemporary 
liberal democratic states that they represent the vanguard and 
defenders of orthodox (and therefore legitimate) democratic theory 
and its expression, the last several years has seen a more vigorous 
and self-conscious development of democratic theory and its 
expression in so-called illiberal states, and primarily among certain 
states organized around principles of Marxism and Leninism. This 
expression of the democratic turn is managed endogenously, 
through a mechanics of managed consultation. It is also expressed 
exogenously, though a system of carefully controlled referendums. 
Both are, in turn available only as an exercise of discretion by the 
PCC. That discretion may be exercised in accordance with 
principles that have yet to be clearly developed. For both elements 
of its Socialist Consultative Democratic model, Cuba was able to 
draw on its historical practices to weave together the two elements 
of consultation and affirmation. Ironically this suggests a quite 
conservative Leninism in the sense of its fidelity to Cuban practices 
and political traditions forged between 1959 and 1976. Yet this 
remains Leninism without a theory; and it is a conservatism that 
tends to be pragmatic and thus unstable and unpredictable.213  
 
As a matter of theoretical possibility, though, the development 
of Socialist Consultative Democracy 2.0 within Caribbean Marxism 
nicely illustrated in the multi-year efforts of the Cuban state to both 
retain its Leninist fundamental organization while developing that 
Leninism to provide a more open space for direct intervention of 
the collective in the management of the state by its Communist 
Party core. In search of an as yet unstable implementation. Cuba’s 
leadership “core” has embarked on a multiyear project that started 
with the reform at the Party level of the political and economic 
model of state organization, the redrawing of the economic plan for 
the nation, and in the embedding of these core principles into the 
operative documents of the administrative organization of the 
state—culminating in the drafting of a new state constitution. In 
that context the Party has also sought to develop mechanisms for 
 
213 See, e.g., BACKER, supra note 3. 
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popular participation in both the Communist Party's political work, 
and in development of mechanisms of popular approval. This 
suggests both the possibilities and limits of democratic expression 
within Cuban Leninism, and its fundamental incompatibility with 
liberal democratic principles of democratic participation.  
 
 
